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INTRODUCTION

Employment arbitration is booming. Arbitration of disputes
involving unionized employees has been routine for half a century and
such disputes continue to be arbitrated in large numbers.' In contrast,
arbitration of disputes involving non-union employees was virtually nonexistent until the 1970s.2 Since then, it has grown substantially, and its
growth is likely to continue
The boom in non-union employment arbitration has caused great
concern about protecting employees' access to courts. Many commentators worry that the resolution of employment disputes in arbitration,
rather than in court, poses dangers to employees, particularly those
asserting claims of race, sex, and age discrimination.4 Virtually every
commentator agrees that employment disputes should be litigated, rather
than arbitrated, unless the employee has voluntarily consented to
arbitration.' While courts and commentators agree that an employee's
voluntary consent is a prerequisite to employment arbitration,6 they do
not agree on when an employee's consent is voluntary and when it is
coerced.7 This Article analyzes that disagreement and proposes a method
of distinguishing voluntary consent from coerced consent in employment
arbitration. In other words, I propose a conceptual framework for

1. See FRANK ELKOUI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKS 3,6,9-10 (4th

ed. 1985); FAIRwXEATHR'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1-9 (Ray J.
Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991).
2. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
4. Some commentators worry less about dangers to the employee involved than about a
broader "public interest." See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part III.A.

7. For definitions of the terms "consent," "voluntary," and "coercion," see infra text
accompanying notes 118-21.
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ensuring that employment arbitration is a voluntary process of dispute
resolution. After this emphasis on the importance of voluntariness to

arbitration, I then argue that it is not the only important consideration.
My second goal in this Article is to show that additional legal reforms
are warranted even after the law is changed to ensure that employment
arbitration proceeds only with the voluntary consent of the parties
involved.
In discussing whether arbitration under particular circumstances is
consensual, and whether that consent is voluntary or coerced, this Article

is confined to employment arbitration. While consent issues pervade
arbitration in all contexts,8 I discuss them in the employment context for
two reasons. The first reason is that concern about consent issues is
heightened when one's livelihood is at stake. The second reason is that
such issues, particularly the distinction between voluntarily-assumed
duties and coercively-assumed duties, are most clearly illuminated by
analysis of the various types of contemporary employment arbitration
agreements.

Many commentators contend that much contemporary employment
arbitration occurs without the voluntary consent of the employee
involved? While I agree, I do so for very different reasons than most
other commentators. These differences lead me to a very different view
about what doctrinal changes are necessary to ensure that employment
arbitration is the product of voluntary consent. To analyze these different
views on consent issues in employment arbitration, it is necessary to

8. See generally Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration,Pilfallsfor Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1994, at 37 (discussing pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts prepared by real estate brokers,
finance companies, health care providers, and insurers, as well as World Cup Soccer tickets and
Cheerios sweepstakes). Consent issues have generated controversy with respect to arbitration
involving: (1) Borrowers; see Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and
FinancialInstitutions:A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
267, 305-06 (1995); Michael Ferry, Is It Time for MandatoryArbitration in Contracts?, BUS. L.
TODAY, May-June 1995, at 22, 22-23; (2) Investors; see Susan Antilla, At the Bar: BrokerageFirms
Steer Dissatisfied Customers Away from Court, but in Only One Direction, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1995, at A29; Margaret A. Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Losing Battles: Investors Fare Poorly
Fighting Wall Street-And May Do Worse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at Al (stating that
"mandatory arbitration has earned a reputation for being stacked squarely against brokerage-firm
customers"); (3) Franchisees; see Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995); (4) Bank customers; see Richard C. Reuben, Decision
Gives Banking ADR a Boost, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994, at 32, 33; and (5) Insurance policyholders; see
Alan I. Widiss, The EnforceabilityofArbitration Terms in UninsuredMotorist Coverages and Other
Form Contracts, 66 IOWA L. REV. 241, 260-65 (1981).
9. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
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provide a general background on employment arbitration. I do this in
Part II.
Then, in Part III, I begin analyzing consent issues. The first step is
both definitional and substantive. To meaningfully discuss "voluntary
consent" in employment arbitration, one must select a definition of the
terms "voluntary" and "consent." I select the understandings of these
terms that are embodied in contract law. On a theoretical level then, Part
III is an argument for a contractual approach to arbitration law-an
argument that arbitration law is, and ought to be, essentially a branch of
contract law. On a doctrinal level, Part III argues that, contrary to most
commentators, only one change in the law is needed to ensure that
employment arbitration is voluntary and consensual. That change is the
repeal of the "separability" doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co." With this
one change, arbitration law will be well-suited to ensure that employment
arbitration proceeds only with the voluntary consent of the parties
involved.
I argue in Part IV, however, that making arbitration voluntary and
consensual is a necessary, but insufficient reform. It is insufficient
because the concept of "voluntariness" is so malleable. The distinction
between voluntarily-assumed duties and coercively-assumed duties
presupposes a baseline of rights that exist prior to the assumption of the
duty in question. The content of the baseline rights determines whether
the subsequent assumption of a duty, such as the duty to arbitrate, is
voluntary or coerced. For this reason, I contend that commentators should
focus not just on voluntary consent, but also on the baseline rights
underlying that voluntary consent. Much of our discomfort with
contemporary employment arbitration, I suggest, is due, not to any lack
of voluntary consent, but rather to a baseline that should be changed.

10. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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II.

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN THE U.S.

A.

Overview of Arbitration

Parties have entered into arbitration agreements" and resolved their
disputes by arbitration for centuries.12 Some parties, however, breach
their arbitration agreements. They refuse to arbitrate a dispute even
though they have agreed to do so. Or they do arbitrate, but lose, and
refuse to comply with the arbitration awards against them even though
they have agreed to do so. These two types of breach raise the key issues
of arbitration law.' 3
In the United States, courts have long dealt firmly with the second
form of breach, refusal to comply with an arbitration award. Courts have
long enforced arbitration awards, and they have done so without much
second-guessing of the arbitrator's decision on the merits of the
dispute.' 4 Until the 1920s, however, courts dealt much less firmly with
the first form of breach, refusal to arbitrate. Prior to the 1920s, an
agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was generally enforceable only by
the remedy of5 nominal money damages, not by the remedy of specific
performance.

11. The term "arbitration agreement" can cause confusion unless used in light of the distinction
between a contract clause requiring the parties to arbitrate, rather than litigate, certain claims (the
"arbitration clause"), and a contract containing the clause (the "container contract"). Sometimes the
arbitration clause is the only term of a contract. In such a case there is no distinction between the
arbitration clause and the container contract, but usually an arbitration clause is part of a contract
with many other terms. The term "arbitration agreement," as used in this Article, refers to the
"container contract."
12. See generallyBruce H. Mann, The FormalizationofInformal Law: ArbitrationBefore the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984).
13. See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 4.1.1 (1994). This treatise
by Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel, and Thomas J. Stipanowich, with contributions by G. Richard
Shell, is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in arbitration law.
14. See I id. § 4.3.2.1.
15. See Iid. § 4.3.2.2 (explaining that in the period 1800-1920 agreements to arbitrate future
disputes were not specifically enforceable in the United States); WEsLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 87 (1930); see also Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 102 F. 926
(2d Cir. 1900) (holding that a plaintiff, who sought damages in the form of lawyer's fees and costs
incurred in defending a lawsuit for breach of an agreement to arbitrate, was entitled to nominal
damages only).
Bruce Benson says "the assumption of court hostility toward arbitration prior to passage of
modem arbitration statutes in the 1920s is clearly unwarranted for some courts, and perhaps
unwarranted for most." Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration
Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, I1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 486
(1995). I disagree. So long as courts typically refused to order specific performance of broad
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Consider, for example, a sales contract between Buyer and Seller
containing the following standard arbitration clause:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the
American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration
Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
If Buyer sought to arbitrate its claim that the goods were not as
warranted, and Seller refused to do so, the only remedy a court would
grant Buyer would be nominal money damages for Seller's breach of the

arbitration clause. 6 The court would do nothing more to encourage
Seller to arbitrate. Therefore, unless Buyer could bring sufficient private
pressure on Seller to arbitrate, 7 Buyer would have to bring its breach

arbitration agreements, it is fair to characterize courts as "hostile" toward arbitration. See IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992) (damages remedy was "largely ineffective").

Benson contends that during the 19th century, courts moved toward enforcing executory agreements
to arbitrate specific disputes, and the law of two states provided generally for the enforcement of
executory arbitration agreements. See Benson, supra,at 485-86. For the proposition that "the general
movement ... was in the direction of holding contracts to arbitrate specific future disputes to be
binding," Benson cites only Jacob T. Levy, Note, The Transformation of Arbitration Law, 18351870: The Lessening of JudicialHostility Towards PrivateDispute Resolution (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review). Benson, supra, at 486. Levy does make this assertion, but cites no cases or
other authority to support it. Levy, supra, at 13-14.
For the proposition that the law of two states provided generally for the enforcement of
executory arbitration agreements, Benson cites Snodgrassv. Gavit, 28 Pa. 221 (1857) and Condon
v. South Side R.R. Co., 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 484 (1858). See Benson, supra, at 486. In neither of these
cases, however, did a court enforce an executory arbitration agreement. In fact, Snodgrass is an
example of a court's refusal to do so. See 28 Pa. at 224. Snodgrass involved a construction contract
containing an arbitration clause. The builder received partial payment and successfully sued the
owner for additional money. See id. at 223. The owner argued the trial court "erred in giving
judgment that the plaintiff could recover, there being no evidence that the case had been submitted
to arbitration." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, apparently on the ground
that the owner had waived its right to arbitration by refusing to choose arbitrators. See id. at 224.
Condon had nothing to do with the enforcement of an executory agreement. It involved the court's
confirmation of an arbitrator's award. See 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) at 489.
16. See Munson, 102 F. at 928.
17. Contracting parties often perform because of private, rather than government, enforcement.
See generallyDavid Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.
373 (1990). That point applies to the performance of arbitration agreements like other contracts. See
Benson, supra note 15, at 484; see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
ContractualRelationsin the DiamondIndustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). After analyzing the
New York Diamond Dealers Club arbitration system, Bernstein concluded that
[u]nlike a court, the [New York Diamond Dealers Club arbitrator] has the ability to bring
unique pressures on the losing party to pay: it can put him out of business almost
instantaneously by hanging his picture in the clubroom of every bourse in the world with
a notice that he failed to pay his debt.
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of warranty claim in court. The parties would litigate, rather than
arbitrate, despite the arbitration clause in their sales contract.
Another example arising out of the contract between Buyer and
Seller would be a lawsuit by Seller asserting that Buyer did not pay for
the goods. Buyer might move to dismiss or stay the action on the ground
that Seller agreed to arbitrate such a claim. The court would reject
Buyer's defense and hear Seller's claim. Again, the parties would litigate,
rather than arbitrate, despite the arbitration clause in their sales contract.
Changing the result in cases like the two examples above required
making pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable through the
remedy of specific performance. That was precisely the effect of the
"modem" arbitration statutes enacted in the 1920s.' s New York was the
first state to enact a "modem" arbitration statute, i.e., a statute making
pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable by specific performance. 9 The United States Arbitration Act, renamed the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1947,20 was enacted in 1925.21 It was the

Bernstein, supra, at 149.
18. Bruce Benson rejects "the contention that modem arbitration statutes were necessary to
counter general and widespread judicial hostility [to arbitration]." Benson, supra note 15, at 486-87.
He rightly emphasizes that "[a]rbitration was well established and growing rapidly long before the
statutes were passed, as nonlegal [private] sanctions induced many members of the business
community to live up to their commitments to arbitrate and to accept arbitration rulings." Id. at 497.
But the argument that private sanctions are sufficient to induce performance is strongest regarding
agreements among members of the same trade association and other repeat-players. See Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:The Case Against Enforcement ofExecutory Arbitration
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REv. 449, 457 (1996) (citing Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation,89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 281 (1990)); see also Chamy, supranote 17, at 408-26. Private
sanctions are unlikely to induce performance of arbitration agreements between parties who neither
share membership in a close-knit group, nor expect to have further dealings with each other. With
respect to this enormous class of contracts, judicial enforcement may be the only enforcement that
induces performance.
Benson supports the hypothesis that the modem arbitration statutes were the result of an
attempt by lawyers to ensure themselves a role in the arbitration process. See Benson, supra note
15, at 492. On this reading of history, arbitration prior to the 1920s--which generally did not involve
lawyers- was a threat to lawyers' incomes and the modem arbitration statutes were "written in a
way that would lead to a role for lawyers in the arbitration process." Id. While this may be true, it
does not undercut the virtue of statutes directing courts to enforce arbitration agreements. What it
does is suggest the possibility of arbitration agreements providing that they are to be enforced only
through private sanctions. Courts should enforce such agreements by refusing to order any remedy
for their breach. See Charny, supra note 17, at 426-29.
19. See 1 MAcNEIL Er AL., supra note 13, § 5.4.1.
20. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669.
21. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1925) (repealed 1947).
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first modem federal arbitration statute.' It makes arbitration agreements
affecting interstate commerce 23 enforceable by specific performance.
For example, if Buyer sought to arbitrate its claim that the goods
were not as warranted and Seller refused to do so, Section Four of the
FAA entitles Buyer to a court order "directing that... arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in [Buyer and Seller's] agree-

ment." 24 Or if Seller sued Buyer asserting that Buyer did not pay for the
goods, Section Three of the FAA instructs the court to "stay the trial of
the action until ...arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms

of the agreement." ' 5 Section Two of the FAA requires courts to enforce
arbitration agreements "save upon such 'grounds
as exist at law or in
26
equity for the revocation of any contract.
B.

Collective BargainingArbitration

While the FAA was the first modem federal arbitration statute, it did

not have a significant impact on employment arbitration until the
1970s.27 Employment arbitration prior to the 1970s was shaped more by
the Labor Management Relations Act of 194728 ("LMRA") than the
FAA.2' An analysis of the LMRA's impact on employment arbitration

22. Other early federal arbitration statutes were not "modem" because they did not make predispute arbitration agreements enforceable by the remedy of specific performance. The following
statutes enforced only post-dispute arbitration agreements between common carriers and their
employees: Transportation Act of 1920, cl. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 470 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.) (setting up a Railway Labor Board with arbitration authority but no enforcement power); Act of July 15, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1926) (establishing the Board
of Mediation and Conciliation to mediate railway labor disputes); Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30
Stat. 424 (repealed 1913) (enforcing post-dispute arbitration agreements between railroads and their
employees); and Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (repealed 1898).
The Railway Labor Act, as amended, still governs disputes in the railroad industry.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994). The Act prescribes the way arbitration will be conducted in the event
of a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate, see 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); it does not, however, make predispute arbitration agreements enforceable. Under the Railway Labor Act, claims that a rail or airline
industry collective bargaining agreement has been breached 'must be submitted for resolution to the
National Railway Adjustment Board. Decisions of the Adjustment Board interpreting the agreement
are subject to limited review in the federal district court." MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRmnNATION LAw § 1.13, at 27 (1988).
23. See infra notes 68-69, 73 and accompanying text.
24. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
25. Id.§3.
26. Id.§2.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-188 (1994).
29. "Arbitration agreements have a long track record in the context of collectively bargained
agreements between a union and an employer. In recent years, arbitration agreements have gained
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requires a brief overview of the law governing labor unions.
The National Labor Relations Ac 3 ("NLRA"), enacted in 1935,
grants employees the right to form labor unions. 3 The NLRA requires
employers to contract with the union as well as with individual
employees. 32 The employer's contract with the union is called a
"collective bargaining agreement.

33

Its contract with the employee,

which is rarely in writing, incorporates the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.3 4

increasing favor in other employer-employee contexts." Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross,
Private Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes, 19
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 205, 209 (1993).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
31. See id.§ 157. Section 157 explains that "[e]mployees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" Id.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1924).
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment ....
Id. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees.. . 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994).
33. DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACnCE 35-36 (1979).
Strictly speaking, [collective bargaining agreements] are not contracts at all, for only in
individual contracts of employment, express or implied, is consideration (the offer of
work and the promise to do it) exchanged. In Great Britain this is still the law, but in the
United States a number of courts gave practical effect to labor agreements by treating
them either as stating a "custom" or "usage" which is reflected in each individual contract
of employment, or by treating the union as an "agent" of its members, or by regarding
individual employees as third party beneficiaries of the contract between the union and
the employer.
Id.
34. The Supreme Court has stated:
Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined
from the connection in which it appears. Collective bargaining between employer and
the ... union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern hiring and work and
pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of employment except in rare
cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordinarily
comes into existence from it alone. The negotiations between union and management
result in what often has been called a trade agreement, rather than in a contract of
employment. Without pushing the analogy too far, the agreement may be likened to the
tariffs established by a carrier, to standard provisions prescribed by supervising authorities
for insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates and rules for service, which do not
of themselves establish any relationships but which do govern the terms of the shipper
or insurer or customer relationship whenever and with whomever it may be established.
...In the sense of contracts of hiring, individual contracts between the employer
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Almost every collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration

clause.35 The clauses vary, but generally provide for arbitration of

"grievances," the labor law term for claims alleging breach of the

collective bargaining agreement.

Under most collective bargaining

agreements, if an employee has a grievance she has no individual right

to arbitration; the employee must persuade the union to demand
arbitration.37 If the union demands arbitration and the employee's
grievance is -arbitrated, that decision will be final and enforced by
courts.38 If the union refuses to demand arbitration, the employee can
sue the employer only after proving that the union's refusal to arbitrate
was a breach of its duty to the employee, the "duty of fair representation. ' 39 Some collective bargaining agreements allow the employer to

assert grievances in arbitration; others do not.
Two important types of cases commonly arise out of the arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 0 In the first type of case,
one party refuses to arbitrate a grievance and the other party seeks a
court order compelling arbitration. In the second type of case, a party
does arbitrate, but loses, and refuses to comply with the arbitration

and employee are not forbidden, but indeed are necessitated by the collective bargaining
procedure.
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-36 (1944).
35. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 61; 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.1.
36. One commentator has noted that
"[i]nterest" arbitration is distinguished from the more familiar grievance or "rights"
arbitration by the fact that in the former situation the designated neutral is employed to
determine the actual contract terms which will bind the parties during the life of their
new agreement, while in the latter situation the arbitrator is only empowered to decide
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the terms of an already existing
contract. The grievance arbiter is generally precluded from adding to or modifying the
terms of the contract in dispute.
Charles B. Craver, The JudicialEnforcement of Public Sector InterestArbitration, 21 B.C. L. REV.
557, 558 n.8 (1980) (citing ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, 47-50).
37. See PLAYER, supra note 22, § 1.13.
38. This finality applies only to claims covered by the arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. Most such clauses make arbitrable only claims asserting a breach of the
agreement. They do not make arbitrable, for example, statutory employment discrimination claims
the employee might have against the employer.
An arbitrator's award against the employee does not prevent the employee from securing
a de novo adjudication of the issue in federal court applying the standards of the
employment discrimination legislation. The arbitrator's award only is evidence going to
the issue and is in no way binding on the court.
Id. § 1.13, at 31-32.
39. Id. § 1.13, at 31.
40. These two types correspond to the two types of breach discussed previously in connection
with Buyer and Seller. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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award, so the other party seeks a court order enforcing the award. Both
4
types of cases involve a breach of the arbitration clause. The LMIRA, 1
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,42 requires courts to deal firmly with
both forms of breach, i.e., to compel arbitration and to enforce an
arbitration award. a3
While Lincoln Mills held that arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements are enforceable under the LMRA, Lincoln Mills
simply ignored the FAA. As stated above, the FAA makes pre-dispute
arbitration agreements enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."44 But Section One
of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
' Although
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."45
Lincoln Mills did not mention the FAA, or perhaps because it did not

41. The LMRA provides in pertinent part:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of money
judgments
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor
organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any
individual member or his assets.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a)-(b) (1994).
42. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
43. "Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes, by implication rejecting the common-law rule... against enforcement of
executory agreements to arbitrate." Id. at 456 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
The "substantive law to apply in suits under [the LMRA] is federal law, which the courts
must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Id. In other words, the federal courts were
directed to develop a federal common law governing collective bargaining agreements. State courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, see Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511-14 (1962), including arbitration clauses, but they must apply the
federal common lav of collective bargaining and enforcement. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

45. Id. § 1.
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mention the FAA, "[t]he most natural reading of the Court's opinion in
Lincoln Mills... is that the FAA in no way governs collective
bargaining arbitration. 46 The Supreme Court's subsequent opinions on
collective bargaining arbitration did not address the FAA until 1987.47
That year, the Court intimated that although the FAA does not govern
collective bargaining arbitration, courts may look to it for guidance in
fashioning the rules of federal common law which govern collective
bargaining arbitration.4"
C. Individual Employment Arbitration49
While arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements have

long been enforceable under the LMRA, it remains an open question
whether arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts are
enforceable under federal law. The LMRA certainly does not make them
so.5" Moreover, Section One of the FAA provides that the FAA does

not "apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 51
The scope of Section One's exclusion is plainly of tremendous
importance to individual employment arbitration. If the exclusion is

construed broadly, the FAA does not require enforcement of individual
46. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.3.1, at 11:9.
47. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 1 MACNEtL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.3.1.
48. See United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987).
The Court stated:
The [FAA] does not apply to "contracts of employment of... workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce," but the federal courts have often looked to the [FAA]
for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that [the
LMRA] empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern
"[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization" under
the federal labor laws.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. Arbitration in the United States has often been divided into two categories: "labor
arbitration" and "commercial arbitration." Under this terminology, arbitration arising out of a
collective bargaining agreement is "labor arbitration" and arbitration arising out of a non-unionized
employee's employment contract is "commercial arbitration.' See Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. at 578; 1 MACNEIL ET At., supra note 13, § 11.3.1, at 11:10. To call arbitration arising out
of any employment contract "commercial," as opposed to "labor," is inconsistent with the ordinary
meaning of those words. Therefore, this Article uses the terms "collective bargaining arbitration" and
"individual employment arbitration," instead of "labor" and "commercial" arbitration.
50. That is because the LMRA covers only "contracts between an employer and a labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
51. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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employment arbitration agreements; such agreements would be enforceable only when state law makes them so. 2 Alternatively, the exclusion
could be narrowly construed to cover only certain classes of employees
so the FAA would require enforcement of agreements involving other
employees.5 3
Despite the importance of determining the scope of Section One's
exclusion, many years passed before courts began to do so. That may be

explained by the paucity of individual employment arbitration cases
before the 1970s." Individual employment arbitration itself was likely
52. Employment arbitration agreements are enforceable under the law of most, but not all,
states. See Hope B. Eastman & David M. Rothenstein, The Fate of Mandatory Employment
ArbitrationAmidst Growing Opposition:A Callfor Common Ground,20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 595,
598-600 (1995); see also UNiF. ARBrTRATION AcT § I n.1, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 & Supp. 1996).
53. Commentators have debated this topic extensively. Some argue that employment contracts
fall outside the scope of the FAA altogether. See Cole, supra note 18, at 449; Christine Godsil
Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-SomeRuminations on theArbitrationofDiscrimination
Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 203, 226-29, 234 (1992); Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers,
Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17
BERKELEY J. EmP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Sharona Hoffman, MandatoryArbitration:Alternative
Dispute Resolution or CoerciveDispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 141-48
(1996); Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitration ofState-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument for
ContainingFederalArbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1695, 1701, 1721-22 (1995); Jennifer A.
Magyar, Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 653 (1992). Others argue that the FAA excludes
only certain types of employment contracts. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.2.2 ("The
phrase 'contracts of employment' in the exclusion means only collective bargaining agreements.');
James A. King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAWv. 97, 114 (1993)
(arguing that the "FAA is best interpreted as excluding only those individual and collective contracts
of employees in the transportation industry or who are otherwise directly engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce'); Gerard Morales & Kelly Humphrey, The Enforceability of Agreements to
Arbitrate Employment Disputes, 43 LAB. L.J. 663, 668-69 (1992) (arguing that Congress intended
the exclusion to apply only to workers in the transportation industry); R. James Filiault, Comment,
EnforcingMandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts: A Common Sense Approach
to the Federal ArbitrationAct's Section 1 Exclusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559, 571 (1996)
(explaining how many federal courts have held that "arbitration clauses in contracts of employment
of those in the transportation industry are exempt from the FAA"); William F. Kolakowski III, Note,
The FederalArbitration Act andIndividual Employment Contracts:A Better Means to an Equally
Just End, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2179 (1995) (arguing that-the FAA exclusion should be limited
to workers in the transportation industries); Patrick D. Smith, Comment, The CourtOpens the Door
to ArbitrationofEmployment Disputes:Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 17 J. CORP. L. 865,
885 n.200 (1992) (explaining how courts have construed the FAA provision narrowly rather than
broadly as advocated by the dissent in Gilmer).
54. The few earlier cases include Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League Baseball Corp., 128
F. Supp. 191, 201 (W.D. La. 1955) (enforcing employment arbitration award against baseball
manager under Louisiana arbitration statute despite statute's exclusion of "contracts of employment
of labor" because "labor" should not be construed to include mental or professional tasks), aft'd,228
F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1956); San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)
(holding FAA not applicable to opera singer's pre-dispute employment arbitration agreement because
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quite rare during this period. There are many possible reasons for this.

First, the prevalence of the employment "at-will" doctrine undoubtedly
kept down the number of employment claims." Second, employment
contracts not embodied in a writing cannot contain an enforceable
arbitration clause; the FAA and state arbitration laws enforce only written
agreements to arbitrate.56 Written employment contracts were rare until
quite recently.57 A third possible reason for the dearth of individual

the contract did "not evidence a transaction arising out of interstate or foreign commerce"), affd,
163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947); Kerrv. Nelson, 59 P.2d 821, 823 (Cal. 1936) (enforcing employment
arbitration award against sales manager's employer under California arbitration statute despite
statute's exclusion of "contracts pertaining to labor" because "labor" should not have been construed
to include mental or professional tasks); UniversalPictures Corp. v. Superior Court, 50 P.2d 500,
501-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935) (same); and In re S.M. Goldberg Enterprises,225 N.Y.S. 513, 516
(Sup. Ct.) (enforcing pre-dispute employment arbitration agreement apparently under New York,
rather than federal, arbitration statute), afTd, 225 N.Y.S. 909 (App. Div. 1927).
55. Where employment at-will is the legal rule, the employer can fire the employee and the
employee can quit at any time, for any reason or no reason at all. This rule is a default rule and
parties can contract around it. See Andrew P. Morriss, ExplodingMyths: An EmpiricalandEconomic
Reassessment of the Rise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679, 680 (1994) (explaining how
the rule is the result of courts responding to problems of nineteenth century employment law cases).
One commentator describes the current status of the employment at-will rule as follows:
Today, most jurisdictions are placing limits on the application of the traditional "at-will"
doctrine. However, a number of states continue to apply the traditional concept and refuse
to create any non-statutory exception. Even states which recognize limits on the
employer's right to discharge construe the limits as narrow "exceptions" to the usual
common law rule allowing termination of at-will employees.
PLAYER, supranote 22, § 1.01, at 3 (footnote omitted). 'Taken together, the explosion of individual
rights legislation and the development of limitations on the employment at-will rule have vastly
increased the legal resources available to employees to challenge various employer decisions." Mark
Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REv. 693, 695 (1993). What Berger
calls "individual rights legislation," i.e., statutes forbidding employers from discriminating on the
basis of race, sex, age, disability, etc., are themselves limitations on the employment at-will rule. In
fact, they are perhaps the most significant departure from employment at-will.
With a clear rule stating that employees can quit at any time for any reason and employers
can fire at any time for any reason, there is little room for dispute. Alternative rules breed more
litigation. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense ofthe Contractat Will, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 947, 97073 (1984); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:Accommodating Just Causeand Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 12 (1993) (stating that the litigation-cost argument is the strongest
argument for Epstein's polar position in favor of the employment at-will rule).
56. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration ofEmployment Disputes
Without Unions, 66 ClH.-KENT L. REV. 753, 768 (1990).
57. See Gerald D. Skoning, The Law of Wrongful Discharge: ContractualCauses ofAction,
in 18"T ANNuAL INsTTuTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 801, 805 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 375, 1989). "In the past, individual employment contracts were generally used
only for high level employees, but increasingly such contract may become more widespread as the
result of the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine." Id. at 804; see also Christopher H. Mills,
DraftingEmployment Agreements: Practicaland Legal Considerations,in HANDLING CORPORATE
EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS 1991, at 407,410 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
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employment arbitration was that parties (particularly employers advised
by lawyers) were reluctant to arbitrate disputes because they lacked
confidence in the finality of arbitration decisions, i.e., they feared that
courts would reopen a dispute after it had been arbitrated." The proarbitration trend in the courts over the last twenty years59 has undoubtedly reduced those fears and led to greater confidence that arbitration
decisions will be enforced by courts. Whatever the historical reason,
courts were slow to interpret the "contracts of employment" exclusion in
Section One of the FAA.
One of the earlier individual employment arbitration cases,
Bernhardtv. Polygraphic Co. of America, 0 reached the Supreme Court
in 1955. Polygraphic fired Bernhardt who sued, alleging breach of his
employment contract. Polygraphic then moved for a stay pending
arbitration because the employment contract contained an arbitration
clause. 61 The relevant state, Vermont, 62 did not have a modem
arbitration statute. 63 Therefore, Bernhardt's promise to arbitrate would
be enforceable by specific performance, i.e., a stay of his lawsuit, only
if the FAA governed his employment agreement.' The Court held that
the FAA did not govern because the agreement did not involve interstate
commerce.65 Therefore, Vermont law governed.66 This conclusion
allowed the Court to avoid the issue of whether Section One's exception
for employment contracts applied to Bernhardt's contract. 67
Cases involving individual employment arbitration became more
common in the 1970s. In the early 1970s, courts first concluded that
certain individual employment contracts "evidence[d] a transaction
involving [interstate] commerce" 6 under FAA Section Two. 69 This

No. 410, 1991) (finding that "written employment contracts are most frequently used with senior
executives or sales personnel").
58. See Berger, supra note 55, at 718 n.164.
59. See infra note 275.
60. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
61. See id.at 199.
62. The Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that the governing state's law was
Vermont's, but it remanded that choice of law issue to the district court. See id. at 205.
63. See id. at 204-05.
64. See id.at 200-01.
65. See id.("There is no showing that [Bernhardt] while performing his duties under the

employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
engaging in activity that affected commerce ...
66. See id.
67. See id.
at 201 n.3.
68. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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holding forced the courts to confront the issue Bernhardt had avoided,
the scope of Section One's exclusion. Cases in the early 1970s held that
Section One did not exclude from FAA coverage employees of securities
broker-dealers" and the professional basketball superstar, "Dr. J."71
These pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements were, therefore,
enforceable under Section Two of the FAA. These precedents have been
followed quite consistently with respect to different types of individual
employment agreements. 72 Courts have generally treated Section One's
exclusion to exclude only collective bargaining agreements. 3 Individual
employment agreements are governed by the FAA.
During the 1970s, courts began to routinely enforce arbitration

69. See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1972)
(professional basketball player); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (securities
employee); Rust v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (securities
employee); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (D.D.C. 1972)
(securities employee); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(sales representative); Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(sales representative).
70. See Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785; Legg, Mason & Co., 351 F. Supp. at 1371.
71. See Erving, 468 F.2d at 1069.
72. Few cases hold that an individual employment arbitration agreement comes within FAA
Section One's exclusion. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.2. Two that do are Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1991), and Wilder v. Whittaker Corp.,
215 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1985).
73. See I MACNEL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.4.3.
The casual approach of the courts in applying the FAA to individual employment
contracts without even noting th[e] question [of the exclusion in Section I]suggests that
the exclusion applies only to collective bargaining agreements. Many courts, with little
or no analysis, have held, for example, employment contracts of securities brokers, who
are clearly involved in interstate commerce, to be covered by the FAA despite the § 1
exclusion.
Id. Contrary to Macneil, Sharona Hoffman contends that "the majority of courts which have
interpreted [Section One's] exclusionary provision support the proposition that all employment
contracts fall outside the scope of the [FAA's] coverage." Hoffman, supra note 53, at 148. Although
Hoffman's article cites Macneil repeatedly, it does not acknowledge that Macneil takes the contrary
position on the empirical question of how courts have construed Section One's exclusion.
Courts have disagreed about whether Section One applies to some or all collective bargaining
agreements. Compare Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159,
1162 (7th Cir. 1984) and United Electric Radio & Machine Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc.,
215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that Section One applies to production workers in
addition to transportation workers) and Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio &
Machine Workers, (U.E.) Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) (stating that Section One
only applies to transportation workers), with Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Section One does not apply to "contracts of employment"), and United
Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 943-44
(10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA is inapplicable to all collective bargaining agreements since
they are "contracts of employment").
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clauses in individual employment agreements, 74 although some held that
certain claims, such as ERISA75 or antitrust violations, were not
arbitrable because of statute7 6 or "public policy. 7 7 These claims,
therefore, would be heard in court even if the parties had agreed in their
employment contract to arbitrate them. The number of individual
employment arbitration cases grew substantially in the 1980s,78 and it
was during this period that many courts held that employment discrimi-

nation claims were not arbitrable. 79 In 1991, however, the Supreme
Court held to the contrary in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.80
8
by holding that an employee's age discrimination claim was arbitrable.

74. See cases cited supra note 69.
75. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
76. See Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 798 (Ct.
App. 1972) (stating that the relevant state labor statute could only lead one to conclude that "an
employee cannot be required to arbitrate a claim for wages"), cert. granted,410 U.S. 908, and aff'd,
414 U.S. 117 (1973).
77. See Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 453 F. Supp. 561,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lewis v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
78. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.2. While the number of reported employment
arbitration cases grew substantially during the 1980s, it is harder to quantify the growth in the
number of employment arbitration proceedings due to the availability of various arbitration forums.
In the early 1990s, an average of 500 such claims were filed with the American Arbitration
Association per year. See Steven M. Kaufmann & John A. Chanin, Directing the Flood: The
Arbitration of Employment Claims, 10 LAB. LAw. 217, 218 (1994). Additional employment
arbitration claims are filed with securities industry self regulatory organizations. See infra Part IV.C.
Others may be filed with other organizations such as JAMS/Endispute. See Richard C. Reuben,
Getting Out ofa .. A.M.S., A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 41.
79. See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1989); Nicholson,
877 F.2d at 227-28; Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-06 (8th Cir.
1988); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543, 546-47 (D.N.J. 1987); Home
v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D. Mass. 1980).
80. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
81. As a condition of Gilmer's employment with Interstate, Gilmer was required to register as
a securities representative with several stock exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"). Interstate required this of its employees in order for it to remain a member of the NYSE.
See id. at 23. The NYSE registration application (Form U-4) provided that Giimer "agree[d] to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" arising between him and Interstate "that [was] required
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or bylaws of the organizations with which [he]
register[ed]." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quoting paragraph 5 of Gilmer's securities registration application), cert. grantedin part,498 U.S.
809 (1990), and aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991). NYSE Rule 347 required the arbitration of any
controversy between Gilmer and Interstate arising out of the termination of Gilmer's employment.

See id.
When Gilmer was 62 years old, Interstate fired him. Gilmer filed an age discrimination
charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC"). He then sued Interstate
alleging that Interstate had fired him because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Interstate, citing the arbitration
clause in the Form U-4 Gilmer had executed, moved to dismiss the case and to compel arbitration.
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Since Gilmer, the Fifth,"2 Sixth, 3 Ninth' Tenth,85 and Eleventh86
Circuits have all held that employees' claims of race or sex discrimination are also arbitrable.
Gilmer has been quite controversial. Since Gilmer, it appears that
more employers have begun to insist upon arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment.8 7 Numerous commentators have attacked

The Supreme Court ruled for Interstate and relegated Gilmer's claim to arbitration. See Gilmer,500
U.S. at 35.
82. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
83. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991).
84. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
85. See Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.
1994).
86. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992).
87. See Mary A. Bedildan, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes Into Wrongful
Discharge Claims: Fertile GroundforADR, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 113, 141-42 (stating that there is
a "current tide of aggressively incorporating arbitration clauses into employer handbooks and
personnel manuals"). Some commentators have found that
more and more large companies are requiring employees to agree at the outset to submit
claims of discrimination that might arise during their employment to binding arbitration .... [I]n recent years, companies like Hughes Aircraft, ITT, Rockwell International,
the Travelers Corporation, and Brown & Root have adopted policies that require
arbitration of discrimination claims for some or all of their employees ....
Eastman & Rothenstein, supra note 52, at 597; see also Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet Singh Uppal,
Evaluating and Using Employer-InitiatedArbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the
Workplace for the Ytenty-First Century, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS INFEDERAL AND STATE CouRTS 875 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1994); Stephen L. Hayford & Michael
J. Evers, The Interaction Between the Employment-At-Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee
Agreements to ArbitrateStatutoryFairEmployment PracticesClaims: Difficult Choicesfor At-Will
Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443, 448 (1995); Jordan L. Resnick, Note, Beyond Mastrobuono: A
Practitioners'Guide to Arbitration,Employment Disputes, PunitiveDamages, and the Implications
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 921 n.44 (1995) (discussing the number
of companies that have implemented pre-dispute arbitration programs for employment-related
disputes); Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to SueforBiasat Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1994, at Al (addressing the growth of arbitration policies in corporations and the response of
Congress and the judiciary); Margaret A. Jacobs, Judges Appear to Be Growing Skeptical of
Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at B2 ("Emboldened by pro-arbitration rulings by the
Supreme Court, hundreds of employers in recent years have put mandatory arbitration clauses in
standard contracts with employees."); Joann S. Lublin, Companies Try to PreventFiredExecutives
from Suing, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1995, at BI ("More than 100 big companies have litigationalternative programs covering at least some employees, up from about 10 a decade ago .... ");
Richard B. Schmitt, More Law Firms Seek Arbitrationfor InternalDisputes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
1994, at B18 (discussing the increase in law firms seeking arbitration for internal disputes).
If Gilmerremains good law, employment arbitration is likely to grow even more. See S. Gale
Dick, ADR at the Crossroads,49 Disp. RESOL. J. 47, 52 (1994) ("More and more firms in certain
industries are inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into their employment contracts .... [E]mployment disputes promise to be one of the biggest growth areas for ADR in the
coming years."). An American Bar Association survey of employer responses to Gilmer found that
54.5% of respondents considered expanding their use of ADR in light of Gilmerbut plan to refrain
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Gilmer, arguing that pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements
should be unenforceable." United States senators and representatives
and the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
have expressed agreement with these arguments.89 The gist of many of
these arguments is that arbitration arising out of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements often proceeds without the voluntary consent of the employee
involved.90 It is these arguments I address in the next Part of the
Article. As these arguments have focused on individual employment
arbitration, rather than collective bargaining arbitration, I address then the
non-union context.9 1
There is another ground for attacking Gilmer that I do not address
in this Article. That is the argument that certain types of claims, such as
employment discrimination claims, should never be arbitrable regardless
of whether the parties involved have voluntarily consented to arbitration.
Commentators attacking Gilmer on this "arbitrability" ground argue, in
other words, that when an employee has agreed to arbitrate all claims
arising out of employment, a court should enforce that agreement if the
claim is of one type (such as contract) but not if the claim is of another
type (such as employment discrimination).92 This argument is based on

from taking action until there are more judicial or legislative developments. See CorporateSurvey
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Wake ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., REPORT
OF THE SUBCOMITEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LABOR LAW SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(Apr. 8, 1992). A GAO survey found that 9.9% of employers arbitrate employment disputes and
"[roughly one-fourth to one-half of... [those] make its use mandatory for all covered employees."
ADR Use in Employment Discrimination, DISP. RESOL. TIMES, Fall 1995, at 2 (citing GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMNT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (GAO/HEHS-95-150 1995) [hereinafter 1995 GAO REPORT]).
88. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text; see also Jennifer R. Dowd, Age
Discrimination,1990-91 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 435, 445
(1992) ("Gilmer threatens to undermine the ADEA's attempt to protect workers from the waiver of
civil rights.').
89. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
91. Courts are just beginning to enforce collective bargaining agreement clauses requiring
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1996).
92. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 53, at 211 (stating that "[I]abor arbitration proceedings ...are too thin to protect statutory rights and develop public law"); Joseph R. Grodin,
Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: A Review of Doctrine and Policy, 14 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. (forthcoming); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Title PI Arbitration, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 209,211 (1995) (opposing enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with respect to Title
VII claims); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and OtherFederalEmployment Statutes: When Is Commercial
Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 573 (1990) (arguing
that Title VII and ADEA claims should not be subject to arbitration "[because] arbitration procedures
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the notion that certain claims have such importance to people who are
not parties to the dispute that the freedom of the parties to choose how
to resolve their dispute should be restricted to advance the interests of
these nonparties.93 The courts have thoroughly rejected this argument.94 I do too. I share Jeffrey Stempel's view that
courts confronted with arbitrability questions should enforce written
agreements to arbitrate without regard to the subject matter of the
dispute or to the legal claims in the dispute unless the party resisting
arbitration can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the arbitration "contract" between the parties is voidable because it was
not the product of sufficiently genuine consent between the parties. 95
Those who reject this contractual approach to arbitration will undoubtedly continue trying to reverse the judicial trend toward making all claims
arbitrable. Whether or not they succeed on that front, however, the issue
of voluntary consent remains. Whatever claims are arbitrable, disputes
will arise over whether particular parties have, or have not, formed
enforceable agreements to arbitrate those claims.

and institutions appear to be... poorly adapted to resolving disputes touching on rights to personal
dignity and equal protection"); see also Resnick, supra note 87, at 918 n.26 (citing various
commentators who argue that certain causes of action should not be arbitrable). Perhaps the strongest
theoretical argument for this position is made by Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the
Sources ofRights: An Approach to the ArbitrabilityQuestion, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1059 (1987).
93. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 92, at 1062, 1082 (arguing for the need to "distinguish those
legal rights that can logically be shaped and enforced in accordance with the will of the parties
concerned," from "those rights ... which are imposed by the state in furtherance of the collective
interest"). A variant of this argument is that, while all claims may be arbitrable, courts should
review, de novo, arbitrators' decisions on certain claims to advance "the public justice goals of
statutory and common-law regulation of the employment relationship." Martin H. Malin & Robert
F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: .4 Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment
Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1190 (1993); see also
Berger, supra note 55, at 718 (theorizing that a distinction should be demarcated between private
disagreements based on contract and those that violate statutory rights since the latter involve an
issue of public concern and as such may warrant potential judicial review).
94. See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 16.

95. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TuL. L. REV. 1377, 1426
(1991).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss1/2

20

Ware: Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent
19961

VOLUNTARY CONSENT

IT[.

VOLUNTARY CONSENT AND THE CONTRACTuAL NATURE OF
ARBITRATION

A.

Voluntary Consent and Pre-DisputeArbitration Agreements

Ensuring that disputes are resolved by arbitration only when the
parties have voluntarily consented to it is a widely held goal. 6 Many
commentators express concern that much of contemporary employment
arbitration occurs without the voluntary consent of the employees
involved.97 I share this concern and seek, in this Part, to propose a
conceptual framework for ensuring that employment arbitration proceeds
only through the voluntary consent of the parties involved.
Commentators' concerns about ensuring voluntary consent in
employment arbitration are raised by the following hypothetical based on
actual recent cases.98 Upon starting her job, Employee signs a form
providing that all disputes arising out of her employment will be resolved
through arbitration. Some time later, Employee alleges that she has
suffered sexual harassment at work. Employee sues Employer alleging
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.99 Employer
moves to dismiss the case on the ground that Employee waived her right

96. Not everyone, however, is concerned about ensuring voluntary consent to arbitration. Alan
Rau and Edward Sherman question "whether it is really productive to worry too much about the
existence of true 'consent' to arbitration." Alan Scott Rau & Edward Sherman, Arbitration in
Contracts of Adhesion 6 (Sept. 3, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Law
Review). They suggest we might "change the focus of our thinking and... approach arbitration as
a question of economic regulation of certain disputes rather than as a means of giving effect to
private ordering." Id. Rather than focusing on contract formation, the law should "place the highest
priority on regulating the arbitration process itself." Id. at 7. This might be accomplished by courts
reviewing arbitration awards with less deference, or by direct regulation of arbitration providers.
97. See inffra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
98. This hypothetical example of Employer and Employee is based on the actual cases
discussed in Margaret A. Jacobs, Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt with a Sex-Bias
Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). The EEOC enforces employment discrimination laws and
investigates charges of employment discrimination by private sector employers. If it finds reasonable
cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, the EEOC attempts to persuade the employer to
eliminate and remedy the discrimination. Remedies may include reinstatement, back pay, or money
damages. If the EEOC is unable to persuade the employer to take action, the EEOC or the employee
may sue the employer. The employee may bring suit only after the EEOC has issued her a 'right
to sue" notice. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How
REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPuTES 4 (GAO/HEHS-94-17 1994)
[hereinafter 1994 GAO REPORT]; see also Megan L. Dunphy, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration:
StrippingSecurities Industry Employees of Their Civil Rights, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169, 1181-82
n.57 (1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:83

to sue when she executed the form providing for arbitration. The court
grants Employer's motion, so Employee brings her claim in arbitration.
The arbitration is conducted by Employer's trade association. Two of the
three arbitrators are white men over sixty years of age.' Employee
fares worse in the arbitration than one expects she would have if the
claim had been heard in court.101
Cases like this have provoked a great outcry from commentators
who contend that employees are being "forced"'0 2 into "mandatory' °3 or "compulsory""' arbitration of their employment disputes.

100. A United States General Accounting Office study of employment discrimination arbitration
proceedings before the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
estimated that 97% of NYSE and NASD arbitrators were white and 89% were male averaging 60
years of age. See 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 8.
101. We can, of course, never know what would have happened had an arbitrated claim been
litigated instead. However, lawyers who regularly litigate sexual harassment claims would most
likely predict better results for the plaintiffs as discussed in Jacobs, supra note 98, at Al, had their
claims been heard in court. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 40 (comparing results of employment litigation and
arbitration).
102. See Cooper, supra note 53, at 229 (finding that "the FAA exclusion was to protect
employees who might otherwise be forced into arbitration agreements"); Hoffman, supra note 53,
at 132-33 ("Employees who wish to obtain employment or retain their positions with employers who
have instituted compulsory arbitration programs are thereby forced to relinquish their rights of access
to the courts .... "); Michael Ferry, MandatoryArbitration Clauses Raise Concerns, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1994, at 2D (referring to predispute arbitration as "forced arbitration');
Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman ClaimsArbiters ofBiasAre Biased, Too, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 1994,
at BI (describing woman who signed pre-dispute arbitration agreement as a "woman forced to
arbitrate a sexual-harassment claim"); Carol Kleiman, SettlingDisputesbyArbitrationFullof Pitfalls
forEmployees, Cmu. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1994, at B2 ("Some employers are forcing all employees to sign
employment contracts that state they will use arbitration to settle disputes.'); see also Stempel, supra
note 95, at 1386 (stating that "[ain employee's predispute agreement to arbitrate, especially when
made a precondition of employment by the employer at the behest of an organization such as the
New York Stock Exchange... seems devoid of meaningful consent").
103. See, e.g., Eastman & Rothenstein, supra note 52, at 595 (finding that "a growing number
of... courts have upheld and enforced mandatory agreements to arbitrate between employers and
employees") (emphasis omitted); Jean R. Sterlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool? Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preface for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 701 (1996) ("[T]he
Supreme Court refuses to recognize that unregulated mandatory binding arbitration agreements can
be determined to consumers, employees, and other little guys.'); Michele M. Buse, Comment,
ContractingEmployment Disputes Out of the Jury System: An Analysis of the Implementation of
Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and Proposalsto Reduce the Harsh Effects of a
Non-Appealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1485, 1523 (1995) (concluding that "an employee will
likely release her right to court adjudication by agreeing to the mandatory arbitration provision in
order to find a job or retain her current position"); Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the
"Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VI Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory
Enforcement Scheme ofArbitrationAgreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L.
REV.435 (1994).
The arbitration of Title VII claims can benefit all parties involved, but only when
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the parties voluntarily decide to arbitrate after the employer's disputed behavior has
already occurred. This ideal situation, however, is not the norm in arbitration agreements
that are written into employment contracts. These largely nonnegotiable contracts are
often offered on a "take it or leave it" basis and therefore do not qualify as being
voluntary.
Id. at 456-57; see also Mark D. Klimek, Note, Discrimination Claims Under Title I: Where
MandatoryArbitration Goes Too Far, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RF.sOL. 425 (1993) (noting that an
arbitration agreement may waive an employee's right to a judicial forum regarding Title VII
violations); Margaret A. Jacobs, RequiredJob-Bias ArbitrationStirs Critics, WALL ST.J., June 22,
1994, at B5 (noting that increased usage of mandatory arbitration in job related discrimination claims
has prompted Congress to introduce legislation restricting its use); Jacobs, supra note 98, at A6
(discussing the growth of mandatory arbitration in securities firms and large corporations "as a fast,
efficient and cheap alternative to employee lawsuits"); Margaret A. Jacobs, Workers Call Some
PrivateJustice Unjust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at B1 (discussing the ramifications of Gilmeras
many companies across different industries are requiring employees to sign arbitration agreements,
thus forfeiting their rights to a judicial proceeding); Frank E.A. Sander & Mark C. Fleming,
Arbitration ofEmployment Disputes UnderFederalProtectiveStatutes: How Safe Are Employment
Rights?, DisP. REsOL. MAG., at 13 (Spring 1996) (Employers are "making mandatory arbitration
provisions a feature-and often a condition--of employment."); L.M. Sixel, Court Says Arbitration
Rule Void/Employees Can't Be Forced to Sign, HOus. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1995 (Business), at 1
("[M]ore and more employers are forcing their employees to abide by mandatory arbitration as a way
to settle disputes.").
Even defenders of Gilmer use the term "mandatory" to describe pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. See Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Coming Home to Contract:Loosening the Death-Gripof
StatutorilyCreated Rights on Arbitration in the Non-Union World, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
243, 249 (1991); see also Edward P. Radetic, Note, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation:
The Supreme CourtEndorses MandatoryArbitration of ADEA Claims, 36 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.741,
749-57 (1992) (discussing the holding in Gilmer as an endorsement of mandatory arbitration in
ADEA claims).
104. See, e.g., R. Bales, A New Directionfor American Labor Law: IndividualAutonomy and
the Compulsory Arbitration of IndividualEmployment Rights, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1863, 1866 n.13
(1994) (defining compulsory arbitration as 'judicial enforcement of contractual agreements to resolve
employment disputes through binding arbitration"); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of
Employment Claims: A PracticalGuide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements,
47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591, 593 (1995) (stating that "employers and employees are increasingly
entering into, and courts are increasingly enforcing, compulsory arbitration agreements") (footnote
omitted); Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way? Compulsory Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer, 19 EPnLOYEE REL. L.J. 197, 197 (1993)
(Gilmer addresses when "an employer [can] compel an employee to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims."); Dunphy, supranote 99, at 1169 (stating that the Supreme Court's holding
in Gilmer "opened the door to compulsory arbitration of employment discrimination claims in the
securities industry's private arbitration system"); Carolyn Grace & Gretchen Van Ness, A Road Not
Taken: ReconsideringMandatoryArbitration of SecuritiesDisputes, BOSTON B.J., JanIFeb. 1992,
at 24, 26 (finding that since Supreme Court intervention "employees in the securities industry have
been compelled to arbitrate common law and statutory claims against their employers"); Jeffrey R.
Knight, Enforcing ArbitrationAgreements Between Employers and Employees, 61 DEF. CoUNs. J.
251,259 (1994) ("The broad federal policy favoring arbitration of disputes is nowhere more evident
than in the area of compulsory, employment-related arbitration agreements."); Steven A. Holmes,
Arbiters of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in LaborLaw, N.Y. TIMSs, Apr. 5,
1994, at B6 (discussing a Congressional study which concluded that'"more employees are compelled
to submit complaints of job discrimination and sexual harassment to arbitration'); Ronald Turner,
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To prevent outcomes like the one in Employee's hypothetical case,
United States senators and representatives have introduced legislation to
direct courts to hear claims like Employee's, rather than relegating them

to arbitration.

5

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC") and the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") are
pursuing the same agenda: to prevent enforcement of pre-dispute
employment arbitration agreements."0 6 These legislators and administrative agencies use the same terminology as the commentators discussed
above.107 The commentators often use the label "voluntary" to describe
employment arbitration in which employees agree, after a dispute has
The legislators and
arisen, to resolve that dispute by arbitration.'
agencies praise such arbitration, but oppose arbitration in cases like
Employee's cases in which the employee seeks to litigate, rather than

CompulsoryArbitration ofEmployment DiscriminationClaims, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.231,290

(1996) ("[C]ompulsory arbitration, while lavful, is not acceptable and should not be enforced absent
the establishment of certain safeguards and processes.").

105. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994, H.R. 4981, 103d Cong.; Protection
From Coercive Employment Agreements Act, S.2012, 103d Cong. The Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1994 was introduced by Reps. Schroeder (D-Colo.), Markey (D-Mass.), and
Margolies-Mezvinsky D-Pa.) and was designed to prevent enforcement of pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate employment discrimination claims. The Protection From Coercive Employment
Agreements Act was introduced by Sen. Feingold (D-Wis.) on April 13, 1994, and was also aimed
at rendering pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering employment discrimination claims
unenforceable. For a further discussion of these unenacted bills, see Eastman & Rothenstein, supra
note 52, at 601-03.
106. In one case, the EEOC obtained a preliminary injunction against an employer, preventing
the employer from requiring employees to sign an arbitration agreement. See United States EEOC
v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, No. CIV.A. H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 19, 1995). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Hoffman, supra note 53, at 136-40.
According to EEOC Commissioner Paul Miller, "[the problem is mandatory arbitration clauses that
are imposed on employees as a condition of employment or continuing employment. We basically
see these as ways to circumvent a party's right to file in federal court and their civil rights as set out
by Congress." Margaret A. Jacobs, Policies RequiringArbitration Challenged,WALL ST.J., Oct. 16,
1995, at B5. In addition, the NLRB's general counsel has taken the position that employers who
insist on an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment have committed an unfair labor
practice in violation of 27 U.S.C. § 158. See Jerry M. Hunter, ADR, the NLRB and Non-Union
Workers, DisP. RESOL. J., Fall 1995, at 18.
107. See supra note 106; see also 140 CONG. REC. E1753 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Markey). Rep. Markey stated that "[the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994J
would prevent employers from forcing their employees to give up their right to pursue employment
discrimination and sexual harassment claims in courts of law." Id. Rep. Schroeder asserted that "[the
practice of mandatory arbitration, which is already in widespread use in the securities industry, is
growing in popularity among many individual corporations especially in the construction, insurance,
banking, and information technology industries." Id.
108. See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, NASD Panelto Study Reforms in ArbitrationProcess, VALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 1994, at CI (describing legislation introduced "to make arbitration in all
employment-discrimination cases voluntary, rather than mandatory, as is now generally the case').
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arbitrate, her claim on the ground that such arbitration is "mandatory."'0 9 While courts have consistently maintained that no one has a
duty to arbitrate unless she has voluntarily consented to do so, ° these
legislators and agencies apparently believe courts are abandoning this
principle in cases like Employee's. These legislators and agencies, like
the commentators discussed above, contend that consent to employment
arbitration is voluntary only when the employer and the employee agree
to arbitrate a dispute that has already arisen."' They contend that
employment arbitration pursuant to post-dispute arbitration agreements
can be voluntary, but
arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration
2

agreements cannot."

These commentators, legislators, and agencies are rightly concerned
about ensuring that employment arbitration is voluntary. But the
proposed remedy, denying enforcement of pre-dispute employment
arbitration agreements, is grossly overinclusive. Contrary to what these
commentators, legislators, and agencies say, employment arbitration
pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration agreements can be voluntary. A predispute arbitration agreement is a contract. The essence of contract law
is the enforcement of a promise to do something, i.e., to "perform," at a
later time." 3 While contract law enforces promises that the promisor
no longer wants to perform, that fact does not deprive contract law of its

109. See Hoffman, supra note 53, at 149-52. The following statement most clearly exeiplifies
the use of the terms "mandatory" and "voluntary" as equivalents of"pre-dispute" and "post-dispute":
It is the intent of this legislation to halt the further erosion of workers' civil rights, and
to reverse the widening application of mandatory arbitration requirements to resolve
employment discrimination cases. I emphasize mandatory arbitration because I want to
be clear that this legislation is in no way intended to bar the use of voluntary arbitration,
conciliation, medication [sic], or other informal quasi-judicial methods of dispute
resolution.
140 CONG. REc. S4266 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
EEOC Chairman Gilbert F. Casellas "ordered the commission's Office of Legal Counsel ...to prepare a proposed EEOC statement backing employers' efforts to develop voluntary
internal ADR programs but opposing plans that require employees to agree to submit employment
discrimination disputes to binding arbitration as a condition of employment." Justice Hires; the
EEOC Embraces ADR, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at A12; see also Richard C. Reuben, Two
Agencies Review ForcedArbitration,A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1995, at 26 (discussing agency reaction to the
growing use of mandatory arbitration by employers for workplace disputes).
110. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643, 648-49 (1986).
111. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
113. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 1.1 (2d ed. 1990).
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basis in voluntary consent. 14 Voluntary consent occurs prior to performance, at the time of contract formation." 5 Pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are like any other contract in this respect. An employee's
voluntary consent to arbitrate occurs at the time such an agreement is
formed.
One should not use the terms "mandatory" and "voluntary"
arbitration as shorthand for arbitration arising out of "pre-dispute" and
"post-dispute" agreements.
This term ["mandatory"] is sometimes used to describe arbitration
resulting from agreements to arbitrate future disputes, since once an
enforceable agreement has been made, arbitration is "mandatory." This
is extremely confusing language because it ignores altogether the
consensual element in contracts.... [lts usage resolves linguistically
the issues of the reality of consent and the effect to be given to consent
by fiat, rather than by analysis revealing the nature of the issues." 6
While arbitration arising out of pre-dispute arbitration agreements can be
voluntary, it is not necessarily voluntary. To assure oneself of this, one
need only think of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement signed at
gunpoint."7 Therefore, arbitration arising out of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements is sometimes, but not always, voluntary. Sometimes, but not
always, an employee relegated to arbitration because she executed a predispute arbitration agreement has voluntarily consented to be so
relegated.
I now propose a conceptual framework for ensuring that employment disputes are resolved by arbitration only when the parties have
voluntarily consented to that. I begin by defining terms. The three terms
that will do most of the work are "consent," "voluntary," and "coerced."
The verb "consent" is used to mean "to agree" and the noun "consent"
to mean "agreement."" s If you agree to hand your wallet to a mugger
holding a gun to your head then you have "consented," as I use the term,

114. See id.
115. See id.

116. 1 MAcNEiL Er AL., supra note 13, § 2.5, at 2:36 n.5 (citation omitted); see also 2 id.
§ 17.1.2.
117. See infra note 120 (explaining that "voluntary" is used in this Article to mean more than
just "volitional").
118. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 n.121
(1986) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 302 (2d ed.
1970)).
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to the delivery of the wallet.11 9 The term "voluntary" is used like it is
used by the commentators discussed above, to describe agreements
entered into freely. 120 For the opposite of "voluntary," I use "coerced"--rather than "forced," "mandatory," or "compulsory." As I use
the terms,1 one's consent must be either voluntary or coerced; it cannot
12
be both.

119. Others use the term consent to refer only to agreements made under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 226-27 (1989) (stating
that "you aren't consenting" when you hand your wallet to the gunman). Herzog sometimes uses the
terms "consent" and "voluntary" action interchangeably. Id. at 215-47; see also JULES STEINBERG,
LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 14 (Bernard K. Johnpoll ed., 1978) ("An act of
consent is an act by which an individual voluntarily agrees to do something.... .').
120. One could use the term "voluntary" to describe all willful acts, i.e., as a synonym for
"volitional." "In the strict sense, an agent acts involuntarily if he fails to satisfy some necessary
condition of free agency. Where this is so, his act cannot be construed as an authentic expression
of his All in his situation." Michael Philips, Are CoercedAgreementsInvoluntary?, 3 LAW & PHIL.
133, 133 (1984). When you deliver your wallet to the mugger holding a gun to your head, you have
done so "voluntarily" in this strict sense. Using the term "voluntary" in this way has its virtues. For
one, it distinguishes the victim who chooses to hand her wallet to the mugger from a victim who
chooses not to, but is physically overpowered by the mugger who then takes the wallet. In the
former case, the victim exercises volition, in the latter case she does not.
The distinction between volitional and non-volitional acts is not, however, important to this
Article because the act discussed in this Article, consenting to arbitrate, is virtually always volitional.
One can imagine, however, the rare case in which "A grasps B's hand and compels B by physical
force to write his name" to the signature line of an arbitration agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 174 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1979). That would be an example of non-volitional "consent"
to arbitration.
The unimportance of the distinction between volitional and non-volitional acts extends
beyond consent to arbitrate to other acts of legal significance. Rarely does the actor claim her act
was "involuntary" in the strict sense of non-volitional. Generally, she concedes that her act was
volitional but claims that it was "involuntary" in the broader sense of "coerced."
In most legal contexts, a coercion claim involves an agent who is confronted with
unvanted alternatives and makes an arguably rational choice among them--a choice
which he may regret having to make (because of his circumstances) but which he will
not regret having made (under the circumstances).... [D]ecisions under [such] circumstances of constrained volition are not involuntary in the same way as in cases of
nonvolition.
ALAN VERTHEIMER, COERCION 171-72 (1987). As cases ofnonvolition are beyond the scope of this
Article, the term "involuntary" will be used in the broad sense of "coerced.' For additional discussion on this issue see Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in XIV NOMOs: COERCION 16,
18 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) ("A man who is physically forced to
squeeze the trigger of a gun does not do it voluntarily in any sense. But a man who fires a gun due
to a threat does in one sense act voluntarily although he does not in another.").
121. For legal scholarship using the terms "voluntary" and "coercion" this way, see, for
example, ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 433 (2d ed.
1993); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE Lam's OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ch. 4 (1993); Robert A.
Hillman, ContractModification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,67 CORNELL L. REV.
680, 682-84 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, ContractLawandDistributiveJustice, 89 YALE LJ.472,
477-80 (1980); Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and Its
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Identifying what constitutes consent has long challenged political

philosophers."2 Likewise, distinguishing coercion from voluntariness
is also "a central problem [of] political philosophy.""l

This Article

does not address these problems. It does not discuss consent, coercion,
and voluntariness as a matter of philosophy. Rather, it discusses them as
a matter of positive law. It examines what does constitute consent in the
law, not what should constitute it; and examines how the law does

distinguish coercion and voluntariness, not how it should distinguish
them.124
The body of law that, more than any other, involves issues of
consent is contract law."2 Likewise, contract law, more than any other
area of law, distinguishes between coercion and voluntariness. 126 Courts
have developed doctrines that operate to ensure that contract law enforces
only those duties which have been assumed through voluntary consent.127
Proof of consent is required to make out a prima facie case of
contractual obligation.128 Mutual assent is an element of contract
formation; a contract cannot be formed unless the parties manifest assent

PersistentSurvival, 47 ALA. L. REv. 387, 405,455 (1996). But see HERZOG, supra note 119, at 227
(rejecting the dichotomy between "voluntary" and "coerced").
122. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 119, at 14.
123. WERTHERIMER, supra note 120, at xii.
124. See Philips,supra note 120, at 143 (stating that "there is no reason to suppose that immoral
compulsion or coercion is coextensive with illegal compulsion or coercion").
125. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994)
("Consent is the master concept that defines the law of Contracts in the United States."). Randy
Barnett has argued persuasively that consent is the central principle of contract law. See generally
Barnett, supra note 118. This consent theory of contract views "contract law as part of a more
general theory of individual [rights] that specifies how resources may be rightly acquired (property
law), used (tort law), and transferred (contract law)." Id. at 292. Under this approach, resources that
have been rightly acquired by one person may only be transferred to another person with the original
owner's consent. See id. at 319. As contract law governs that process of transfer, contract law's
primary function is to ensure that the transfer is consensual and that consent is given under
circumstances in which it retains its moral significance. See id.
126. Contract law "provides the most fully developed account of coercion in the law."
WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 15.
127. I state that these doctrines "operate" to ensure that contract law enforces only voluntarily
assumed duties, rather than stating that these doctrines are designed to ensure that contract law
enforces only consensually assumed duties. I do so because common law doctrine is the product of
spontaneous evolution rather than the product of conscious design. The decisions of many judges
contributed (and continue to contribute) to the development of contract law doctrines. While there
may be as many rationales for these doctrines as there are judges who contributed to them, I do
believe that the primary rationale is to ensure that contract law enforces only duties which have been
assumed through voluntary consent.
128. See Barnett, supra note 118, at 318.
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to its terms.12 9 The requirement of mutual assent operates to ensure that

contract law imposes liability only on those who manifested assent to,
i.e., consented to, assume a duty.13 °
While the doctrine of mutual assent ensures consent, it does not
distinguish between consent that is voluntary and consent that is coerced.
That distinction is made by one of contract law's defenses to enforcement, duress. 31 Contract law's defenses describe circumstances that
deprive consent "of its normal moral, and therefore legal, significance." 132 The duress defense describes circumstances in which consent
was coerced, as opposed to voluntary, 3 3 and therefore lacks its normal
13 4
significance.

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, §§ 3.1-.2.
See infra Part III.B.I.
See infra Part III.B.2.
Barnett, supranote 118, at 318. Barnett goes on to discuss contract defenses as follows:
The first group of defenses-duress, misrepresentation, and (possibly)
unconscionability-describes circumstances where the manifestation of an intention to be
legally bound has been obtained improperly by the promisee. The manifestation of assent
either was improperly coerced by the promisee or was based on misinformation for which
the promisee was responsible. The second group-incapacity, infancy, and intoxication-describes attributes of the promisor that indicate a lack of ability to assert meaningful assent. The third group--mistake, impracticability, and frustration--stem from the
inability to fully express in any agreement all possible contingencies that might affect
performance. Each describes those types of events (a) whose nonoccurrence was arguably
a real, but tacit assumption upon which consent was based, and (b) for which the
promisee should bear the risk of occurrence. Each type of defense thus is distinguished
by the way it undermines the normal, presumed significance of consent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
133. "The common law courts developed the doctrine of duress to deal with coercive behavior."
FARNSWORTH, supranote 113, § 4.9. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 9-2 (3d ed. 1987) (equating duress and coercion); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE 93-103 (1981); Sco r & LESLIE, supranote 121; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 615-16 (1943); Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error,
Fraud,Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 82 (1989); see also United States v.
Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1122 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (enforcing
contract modifications and relying on the defense of duress to render "[a]ll
coercive modifications"
unenforceable). See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion,and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L.
REV. 79 (1981) (discussing the impact of the psychological concepts of coercion and duress on
difficult decisions).
134. "Our moral and legal responses to individual behavior are typically based on... the
voluntarinessprinciple.The general assumption is that promises are binding... if, but only if, the
relevant actions are voluntary." WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 4. "[Flacilitating the exercise of
voluntary choice is the central normative justification for contractual enforcement." Robert E. Scott
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1919 (1992). "The
libertarian theory of contract law is premised upon the belief that individuals have a moral right to
make whatever voluntary agreements they wish for the exchange of their own property, so long as
the rights of third parties are not violated as a result." Kronman, supra note 121, at 475.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:83

The duress defense, then, combines with the requirement of mutual
assent to ensure that contract law enforces only duties assumed by

voluntary consent, not duties assumed under coercion. 135 The contract
law doctrines of mutual assent and duress embody the accumulated
wisdom of countless courts presented with issues of what constitutes
consent and how to distinguish voluntary from coerced consent. There is
no more reason to abandon these doctrines when the contract in question
happens to be an arbitration agreement.1 36 Because the problem of

determining consent in arbitration law is merely an application of that
problem in contract law, 137 courts can and should ensure that arbitration
is consensual by applying the requirement of mutual assent to arbitration
agreements in the same way it is applied to contracts in general.
Likewise, because the problem of distinguishing voluntariness and

coercion in arbitration law is merely an application of that problem in
contract law, courts can and should ensure that consent to arbitration is
voluntary by applying the duress defense to arbitration agreements in the

same way that defense is applied to contracts generally.'38 The follow-

135. "[A] fundamental problem of contract law is to specify the conditions under which
individuals can voluntarily undertake mutual obligations that they otherwise would not have."
WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 19. As this Article explains in Part IV, contract law does not do
this on its own. Contract law's distinction between voluntarily-assumed duties and coercivelyassumed duties presupposes a baseline of rights specified by non-contract law. See infra Part IV.A.
136. FAA Section Two "establishes that a duty to arbitrate cannot be imposed upon anyone
under the FAA without agreement. It thus reflects the 'basic principle that arbitration is a creature
of contract."' 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supranote 13, § 17.1.1 (quoting HRH Constr. Corp. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (N.Y. 1978)). "This principle is fundamental also to collective
bargaining arbitration." 2 id.§ 17.1.1 n.1 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
137. "Consent and, to a lesser extent, formality requirements pervade the general law of
contracts and hence arbitration ....Since arbitration law is a specialized branch of contract law,
almost any issue that can arise in contract law generally can arise in an arbitration context." 2
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.1.A. As a general matter, "[c]onsent to arbitration is governed
by general contract law." 2 id. § 17.2.1.
138. While Jeffrey Stempel generally agrees with the contractual approach to arbitration law,
he proposes five defenses to arbitration contracts: blameless ignorance; dirty-dealing; inescapable
adhesion; substantive unconscionability; and defective agency. See Stempel, supra note 95, at 1427.
He says the first four "are to some extent an effort to recapture the paradigm of voluntarism and
consent in this comer of contract law." Id. at 1447. This Article rejects Stempel's proposal to
develop new doctrinal categories to ensure voluntary consent to arbitration agreements. Contract law
has already developed doctrines to do that. Arbitration agreements are contracts. The doctrines that
ensure voluntary consent to contracts generally can and should be used to ensure voluntary consent
to arbitration. Why reinvent the wheel?
In discussing courts' treatment of arbitration agreements, Stempel states that
[c]ase reports teem with general language in which courts state that arbitration clauses
may be set aside on standard common-law contract grounds. But courts so seldom find
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ing section of this Article discusses how mutual assent and the duress
defense apply to employment arbitration agreements.
B.

ContractLaw Doctrines and Employment Arbitration

1. Mutual Assent
The requirement of mutual assent to form a contract may be the
most underappreciated aspect of contract law. Many contract law

casebooks highlight bases for enforcing promises (i.e., consideration and
reliance) and/or remedies for breach as the core principles at the
beginning of the book, before turning to mutual assent ("offer and
acceptance") as an afterthought.13 9 But the importance of mutual assent

to contract law-distinguishing consensual from nonconsenual transfers-is huge. 140 As Allan Farnsworth puts it, the requirement of

mutual assent14t "is implicit in the principle that contractual liability is

consensual."'
This principle that contractual liability is consensual refers not to
subjective consent, but to objective consent. 42 The requirement to form
a contract is not that parties actually assent to its terms. The requirement
is that they take actions-such as signing their names on a document or

these grounds or give them serious discussion that one must inevitably conclude that
courts generally treat the arbitration text as the irrefutable embodiment of agreement.
Id.at 1389-90 (footnote omitted). If courts are doing this, perhaps they can be more easily persuaded
to apply the traditional contract doctrines they routinely apply in contract cases to arbitration
agreements rather than devise entirely new doctrines for arbitration agreements.
139. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 71 (1995); JOHN P.
DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 1993); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH &

,ILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995); DANIEL WM. FESSLER
& PIERRE R. LOISEAUX, CONTRACTS (1982); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW (5th ed. 1990); ROBERT W. HAmILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1992); EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAW (4th ed. 1991); ARTHUR ROSETr, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (5th ed. 1994); SCOTT
& LESLIE, supra note 121; ROBERT S.SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION (2d ed. 1992).
This organization may lead students studying contract law to think that the central principle
of contract law is promise (if consideration/reliance is taught first) or expectation/reliance/restitution
interests (ifremedies are taught first). Leading off with mutual assent may lead students to think that
the central principle of contract law is consent. Students may also find the course more accessible
when topics are placed in the chronological order of a contract dispute: formation, interpretation,
performance/breach, and remedies.
140. Barnett devotes the bulk of his article outlining the consent theory of contract to the topic
of manifestations of assent. See generally Barnett, supra note 118.
141. FARNSWORTH, supranote 113, § 3.1.
142. See id. §§ 3.6, 3.9.
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saying certain words--that would lead a reasonable person to believe that
they have assented to the terms of the contract. 43 In other words,
contract formation technically requires, not mutual assent, but mutual
manifestations of assent. 1" Contract law does this to satisfy "the
inescapable need of individuals in society and those trying to administer
a coherent legal system to rely on appearances-to rely on an
individual's behavior that apparently manifests their assent to a transfer
145
of entitlements.'
Throughout this Article, I use the term "consent" rather than the
more cumbersome term "manifests assent." '46 As stated above, I use
the term "consent" to mean "agree" without implying that the agreement
is voluntary.

147

Issues of consent have arisen in a number of employment arbitration
cases arising out of the securities industry. These issues arise because of
the particular documents signed by securities employees as a condition
of employment in that industry. To comply with regulations governing
the securities industry, 48 securities firms must belong to one or more
Self Regulatory Organizations' 49 ("SROs"). These SROs include the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), and the major
securities exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"). 50 The rules of each SRO require that certain employees of
each of its members register with the SRO. 5' I use the term "securities

143. See id. § 3.6.
144.

According to the objectivists, a party's mental assent was not necessary to make a
contract. If a party's actions, judged by a standard of reasonableness, manifested an
intention to agree, the real but unexpressed state of the party's mind was irrele-

vant .... By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become
ascendant and courts generally accept it today.

Id.
145. Barnett, supra note 118, at 301 (footnote omitted).

146. The reader should recognize, however, that most contracts cases and scholars use the term
"manifests assent."

147. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
148. See infra Part IV.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)-(b) (1994).
150. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW Op SECURmS REGULATION 385 (2d ed. 1990).
151. See, e.g., 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2345 (1984) [hereinafter NYSE Rules]. The NYSE
Rules provide:
(a) No member or member organization shall permit any natural person to
perform regularly the duties customarily performed by (i) a registered representative, (ii)
a securities lending representative, (iii) a securities trader or (iv) a direct supervisor of (i),
(ii) or (iii) above, unless such person shall have been registered with, qualified by and
is acceptable to the Exchange.
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employees" to refer to those employees required (by SRO rules) to
register with the SRO.152
A number of cases raise the issue of whether a securities employee
registering with an SRO thereby consents to arbitrate employment
53
disputes. For instance, in Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
Chan worked as a securities employee for Drexel, a member of the
NYSE.IM Chan's signed application, known as Form U-4, to register
with the NYSE and other SROs required that Chan agree to abide by the
rules of the SROs to which she was applying. 5 One of the NYSE
rules, Rule 347, provided for arbitration of all employment disputes. 5 6

When Chan brought a wrongful discharge suit against Drexel, Drexel
sought a court order relegating Chan's claim to arbitration.157 The court
58
refused to issue such an order.
Drexel's argument that Chan consented to an arbitration agreement
was based on the concept of incorporation by reference. 59 According
to Drexel, by signing her U-4, Chan consented to the NYSE rules, as
well as to the terms contained in the U-4, thereby incorporating by
reference NYSE Rule 347 into her contract.1 60
The Chan court conceded that "parties may incorporate by reference
into their contract the terms of some other document" but went on to
state that

(b) No member or member organization shall permit any natural person, other
than a member or allied member, to assume the duties of an officer with the power to
legally bind such member or member organization unless such member or member
organization has filed an application with and received the approval of the Exchange.
Id.; see also Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9391 (1995) [hereinafter AMEX Rules] (requiring
approval of registered employees and officers of members or member organizations by the Exchange
before they can perform their duties).
152. Some commentators use the term "registered representative" to describe these employees.
See, e.g., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE

TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. 113 (Jan.
1996); 1994 GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 7-8. Technically, however, registered representatives
are a subset of the employees required to arbitrate by SRO rules. See supra note 151.
153. 223 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1986).
154. See id. at 839.
155. See id. at 840.
156. NYSE Rules, supra note 151, 2347.
157. See Chan, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
158. See id.
159. "Incorporation by reference is a particularly important consensual concept. It is, however,
simply a way of consenting to a term in a contract without actually repeating in the contract what
is being incorporated. As such it is indistinguishable from other methods of manifesting consent."
2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 17.3.2.1 (footnote omitted).
160. See Chan, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 843-46.
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[flor the terms of another document to be incorporated into the
document executed by the parties the reference must be clear and

unequivocal, the reference must be called to the attention of the other
party and he must consent thereto, and the terms of the incorporated
document
must be known or easily available to the contracting par1
ties.

16

These requirements ensure that a document is incorporated by reference
into a contract only if the parties consent to such incorporation. The
Chan court held that these requirements were not met; therefore, Chan's

U-4 did not incorporate by reference NYSE Rule 347. The U-4 did not
identify any document by title although the rules of an organization, like
the NYSE, "may be found in a plethora of sources, including its

constitution, statutes, bylaws, manuals, and memoranda."' ' The court

found that "[o]ne who reads [the U-4] would not even know which body
of rules to consult to find the elusive arbitration language. ' 63 In short,
the Chan court held that Chan did not consent to NYSE Rule 347, and,
64
therefore, did not consent to arbitration of her employment disputes.'

In contrast to Chan's U-4, other SRO application forms expressly
state that the employee is agreeing to arbitrate. Securities employees who
have signed such forms have had less success arguing that they did not
consent to arbitration. 165 In Spellman v. Securities, Annuities and
161. Id. at 843 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams Constr. Co. v. Standard-Pacific Corp., 61
Cal. Rptr. 912, 920 (Ct. App. 1967)).
162. Id. at 845. "The constitution alone of the NYSE 'is a formidable document of some 70
pages."' Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 845-46; accordIn re Drachman & Co., 195 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(holding that "[a]bsent any reference to arbitration in the application or in the employment
agreement, it is not established that [the securities employee] in undertaking the employment gave
his assent to any provision for arbitration of disputes").
165. For instance, the predecessor to Form U-4, Form RE-I, signed by the employee in Frame
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Ct. App. 1971), provided for
arbitration of "any controversy between [a securities employee] and any [employer] or member
organization arising out of ... employment or the termination of... employment."' Id. at 813. The
employee "contend[ed] that the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable because there was no
mutual assent to that provision. Specifically he contend[ed] that he was unaware of the clause
because he did not read it." Id. The Frame court rejected the employee's argument. See id.
In a virtually identical case, Ware v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc., 100 Cal.
Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1972), cert. granted,410 U.S. 908, and affd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), the court
likewise rejected a securities employee's argument with the following reasoning:
A reasonable person seeking employment in an industry as highly regulated as the
securities exchange with knowledge of a registration requirement cannot escape the
binding effect of arbitration rules referred to and expressly set forth in the RE-I form,
which he has signed, by claiming lack of knowledge of the rules integrated into the form.
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Insurance Services, Inc., 6 for instance, Spellman signed a U-4 stating:
"'I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise
between me and my firm... that is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I
register ... ."'167 Spellman registered with the NASD, whose rules
require arbitration of employment disputes. 68 Spellman also signed an
employment contract in which he promised to "'strictly adhere to the
Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.... as set forth in the NASD Manual."" 69 In short, Spellman
signed documents that provided for arbitration more openly than the
documents Chan signed. The Speilman court relied on these differences
7
to distinguish Chan and to order arbitration of Spellman's claim.
Spellman's argument that he did not consent to arbitration was weaker
than Chan's because the documents Spellman signed openly and clearly
provided for arbitration.
These cases, illustrate the important role contract doctrine can and
should play in ensuring that employment arbitration is consensual. When
an employee signs a document, such as a U-4, the employee is plainly
consenting to something. Under a subjective theory of contract, a court
would ask: "What did the employee think she was consenting to?" Under
the prevailing objective theory of contract, however, the legal question
is: "What would a reasonable person in the employer's position think the
employee was consenting to?' 171 If the answer to this question does not
Id. at 795.
166. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct. App. 1992).

167. Id. at 430.
168. See id. at 429.
Part II, section 8(a) of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure also requires

arbitration of "[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under Part I of
this Code between or among members and/or associated persons... arising in connection
with the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activities of such
associated person(s)...
Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 430-31.
171. Commentators have advocated a departure from the objective theory of contract in
employment arbitration cases in favor of an inquiry focusing on the employee's subjective beliefs.
Because the employee--as a cost of securing efficient resolution of claims--is typically
required to forgo such statutory rights as jury trial (and possibly also expansive statutory
remedies), the courts should apply the usual standard for enforcing waivers of statutory
rights: the waiver must be explicit, knowing, and voluntary.
Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the PrivateArbitration of Public-LawDisputes, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 652; see also Buse, supranote 103, at 1518-24 (1995) (proposing a totality of
the circumstances approach in determining the validity of arbitration agreements).
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include "the arbitration clause" then contract law precludes relegating the
employee's claim to arbitration.

What would a reasonable person in the employer's position think an
employee like Chan or Spelman was consenting to? Judge Learned Hand
may have answered: "All the terms on the document the employee signed
and all the rules of the SRO."'72 Judge Hand may have dissented from
Chan on the ground that a reasonable person in the position of Chan's
employer would have believed that, because of her signature on the U-4,
Chan consented to all NYSE rules, even though these rules were spread
73
out over many documents, some totalling well over seventy pages.
While reasonable people in Judge Hand's day may have believed
that a signature on a document constitutes consent to all the document's

terms, reasonable people today may no longer believe that. Today, people
routinely sign long standardized documents presented to them on a take-

it-or-leave-it basis. Standardized agreements are commonly drafted by
one party.' 74 The non-drafting party often does not read the standardized agreement in full."7 The non-drafting party, according to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "does not assent to a term if the other
party has reason to believe that the [non-drafting] party would not have

Apparently, some courts are beginning to stray from the objective theory of contract in
employment arbitration cases as well. In PrudentialInsurance Co. ofAmerica v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995), the Ninth Circuit appears to have departed from
the objective theory of contract in focusing on what the employees subjectively believed. The court
characterized the issue as whether the employees "knowingly" agreed to arbitrate. See id.at 1305.
The court purports to derive this "knowingly" requirement from the legislative history of Title VII.
See id. at 1304-05. It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will read Title VII as requiring
an exception to the rule that "[w]hen deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain
matter... courts generally.., should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation
of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995); see also
Resnick, supra note 87, at 923 (concluding that Lai "is clearly not in line with Gilmer and its
progeny").
Lai makes the right to litigate, rather than arbitrate, employment disputes less alienablethan
other rights. Most rights are freely alienable, i.e., they can be alienated by contract. Some rights are
inalienable. And there is an intermediate category of rights which are alienable, but it takes more
than contract to alienate them. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81
CAL. L. REV. 431,443-45 (1993). Lai strays from Supreme Court precedent by placing the right to
litigate employment disputes in this intermediate category. See infra Part IV.C.3.
172. "A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not ... ." Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947).
173. See Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Ct. App. 1986).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1979).
175. See id. § 211 cmt. b.
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accepted the agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the
17 6
particular term."
While few non-lawyers would be able to cite authority for this rule,
most people conduct themselves as if they believe it exists. In other

words, most people routinely sign documents they have not carefully
read because they correctly assume courts will not hold them to the terms
if those terms are "bizarre or oppressive or eviscerate[ the non-standard
terms explicitly agreed to."'77 This rule is, therefore, consistent with the

objective theory of contract. When a non-drafting party signs a standardized agreement, a reasonable drafting party understands that the non-

drafting party is not necessarily consenting to all the terms of that
agreement. 78
In this regard, an employment agreement is like any other contract.

Many employment agreements, such as those that incorporate by
reference the rules of an SRO or an employee handbook, are standardized
agreements. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, whether an
employee signing such an agreement consents to arbitration will vary
depending on the facts of the case. 179 If, as in Spellman, the duty to
arbitrate is prominently displayed near the signature line of the standard-

176. Id. § 211 cmt. f; see also id § 211(3) (providing that "[w]here the other party has reason
to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement"); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound
ofSilence: DefaultRules and ContractualConsent,78 VA. L. REV. 821, 889-90 (1992) (stating that
in form contracts, "unless the presence of a clause that deviates from commonsense expectations is
brought to the attention of the other party... the drafting party has no reason to believe that the
other party consented to it).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1979). "Although customers
typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know
the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of
reasonable expectation." Id.
178. This rule is consistent with the objective theory of contract, because it relies on
"reasonableness," which has evolution built within it. That which is reasonable changes over time
and from place to place.
This also shows that the objective theory of contract has a built-in circularity problem.
Whether it is reasonable for a non-drafting party to sign a standardized agreement without reading
and understanding it depends on whether courts are likely to hold that the non-drafting party's
signature constitutes consent to all the terms of that agreement. But whether courts hold that the nondrafting party's signature constitutes consent to all the terms of the agreement depends on whether
it is reasonable to sign the agreement without reading it. A reasonableness standard is circular, as
Richard Epstein notes in another context, "because the level of expectation said to determine the rule
rests in large measure upon what the rule is ....
Rules determine expectations as much as
expectations determine rules." Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of
Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STuD. 165, 204 (1974).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
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ized agreement, 80 the employee probably consents to arbitrate. 8' If,
as in Chan, the duty to arbitrate is buried among many pages of fine
print, l 82 then the employee probably does not consent to arbitrate.
Other relevant factors will certainly include how widespread employment
arbitration is in the particular industry or location. Employment

arbitration involving securities employees has become so widespread'83
that a reasonable employer in that industry might now believe that
everyone signing a U-4 consents to arbitration even if, like Chan's U-4,
it makes no overt reference to arbitration.
2. Duress
The requirement of mutual manifestations of assent to form a
contract ensures that contract law enforces only consensually-assumed
duties but it does not ensure that the consent will be voluntary. The
duress defense does that. It describes circumstances in which a manifestation of assent is coerced, as opposed to voluntary.'8 4 It operates to
ensure that contract law enforces only duties that have been assumed by

voluntary consent. A party consenting to a contract does not voluntarily
consent to it if that consent was given under duress. 8
Duress is present when consent is "induced by an improper threat
by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative" but
to consent. 8 6 What threats are improper?187 Threats to commit a

180. See Spellman v. Securities, Annuities and Ins. Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427,430 (Ct.
App. 1992).
181. Likewise, if an arbitration clause is separately initialed by the employee, the employee
almost certainly consents to it.
182. See Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845-46 (Ct. App. 1986).
183. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 965, 997 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1993).
184. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
185. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.16.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1979).

187. The Restatement provides:
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime
or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad
faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly
benefit the party making the threat,
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crime or tort, such as the mugger's threat to shoot unless the victim
agrees to deliver her wallet, have long been held improper188 because
the person making the threat has a duty not to do the threatened act. Or,
to put it another way, the victim of the threat has a right to be free of the
threatened act. Importantly, the victim also has a right to whatever she
must now forgo-such as the wallet--to avoid the threatened act. The
threat requires the victim to abandon one of these two rights (possession
of the wallet or bodily integrity) in order to protect the other. 89 The
choice between two rights is the essence of "traditional" duress. That
consent is coerced in such cases seems noncontroversial. They are the
easy cases, such as the employee who signs an employment arbitration
agreement with a gun to her head.
The doctrine of duress, however, "has expanded well beyond these
traditional situations and ...a threat may be improper even though the
one who makes it has a legal right to do the threatened act." 190 This
expansion of duress "under developing notions of 'economic duress' or
'business compulsion.' 191 must be limited to prevent all offers from
being deemed "improper" threats.19 2 "The problem then becomes one
193
of distinguishing impermissible threats from legitimate offers."'
Courts attempting to do this often focus on the fairness of the contract. 94 This case-by-case fairness inquiry makes it difficult to generalize about what sort of threats constitute "economic" duress, 95 and may
explain the "vagueness of the concept of economic duress." '96 With
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.
Id. § 176.
188. See id. § 176 cmt. b.
189. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293,
295 (1975).
190. FARNSwORTH, supra note 113, § 4.17, at 275.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 176 cmt. a.
192. An offer to form a contract differs from a promise to make a gift in that the contract
offeror threatens to withhold that which he offers unless the offeree performs or makes a (legally
binding) promise to perform. "Because all consent in contract occurs in part because another party
has power over the consenter, it is impossible to define duress as simply using power to cause
another to consent without rendering all contracts unenforceable." 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 19.2.3.1.
193. FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.16, at 273.
194. "The fairness of the resulting exchange is often a critical factor in cases involving [such]
threats." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 176 cmt. a.
195. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.16.
196. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv.L. REV. 561,
629 (1983).
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that caution in mind, however, it is possible to consider the sort of
threats that might raise an "economic" duress issue in the employment
arbitration context.'97
Two sorts of threats seem likely to recur. The first is where the
employer refuses to hire a job applicant unless that applicant signs an
arbitration agreement, making the arbitration clause a non-negotiable term
of the employment contract. In this situation, the employer's threat is: "I
will not hire you unless you sign the arbitration agreement." The second
recurring threat involves an at-will employee'98 who has been employed for some time but has not signed an arbitration agreement. The
employer may threaten that the employee will be fired unless he or she
signs an arbitration agreement.
In neither of these cases is there "traditional" duress because in both
cases the employer has a right to take the threatened action. That is, the
employer has a right to refrain from hiring and a right to fire an at-will
employee.' 99 Or, to put it another way, in neither case does the employee have a right to be free of the threatened act. The threats may,
however, constitute "economic" duress even though the employer has a
right to do the threatened act.2" Again, this raises the problem of
distinguishing impermissible threats from legitimate offers. This problem
is addressed with respect to the two sorts of threats discussed above in
Rust v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 1 and Standard Coffee Service Co. v.
Babin.20 1
Rust involved an arbitration clause as a non-negotiable condition of

197. See 2 MAcNEiL ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.2.3 (stating that "[lto date, there are no
significant judicial opinions elaborating and applying the principles of duress and undue influence
respecting the enforcement of arbitration agreements").

198. See supranote 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the employment at-will rule.
199. Regarding the employer's right to fire an at-will employee, Sharona Hoffman states that
continued employment should not be deemed to constitute consideration for an
employee's agreement to sign a separate compulsory arbitration policy. The position was

already promised to the employee at the commencement of his or her employment and,
assuming that an employment contract exists, the employer has a legal duty to allow the

employee to retain his or her job for the contract period barring justifiable reasons for
termination.

Hoffman, supra note 53, at 154. This statement of the employer's "legal duty" is inapplicable to the
at-will employee, i.e., the vast majority of employees. Employment at will has no "contract period"

and the employer does not need a reason for termination. See Morriss, supra note 55, at 680.
200. In other words, the employer may have a duty to refrain from threatening the act although
the employer has a right to do the act. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.17.
201. 352 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
202. 472 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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employment." 3 Drexel was a member of the NYSE. 20' As discussed
above, the rules of the NYSE require its members to hire as securities
employees only those people who have registered with the NYSE. 0 5
Accordingly, Drexel would not employ Rust until he completed an
application to register with the NYSE.2 6 The registration application
contained a clause providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of
Rust's employment.2 7 Rust later sued Drexel, which moved to stay the
action pending arbitration.20 8
The court addressed the question of whether Rust had signed the
arbitration agreement under duress in the following manner:
The contract was one of employment, the essence of which centered
about compensation, commission and other prerequisites. There is no
suggestion that these were not bargained for at arms length between
[Rust] and [Drexel]. This aspect of their negotiations was not on a
"take it or leave it basis." [Drexel] was neither a monopolist nor a
public utility. [Rust], if dissatisfied with the compensation offered or
other conditions pertaining to his work, was free to seek employment
with another investment banker. Although it is true that he would still
be required to accept the arbitration clause, such a provision was
relatively of minor significance as against the terms of compensation
and commission.0 9
The court concluded that "[u]nder all the circumstances, it cannot be said
that the arbitration requirement as a condition of employment constitutes
duress."2 1 The court's conclusion seems right.2 ' The contrary holding would find economic duress when the employer's offer contains a
single non-negotiable term. While it is troubling that each employer in
203. See Rust, 352 F. Supp. at 716.

204. See id.
205. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
206. See Rust, 352 F. Supp. at 716.

207. See id.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 717.
210. Id. at 718.

211.
There is no duress here unless the signature was induced "by an improper threat" by the
party insisting on the arbitration clause that leaves the other party with "no reasonable
alternative." It is hardly improper to threaten to refuse to deal without an arbitration

agreement. Furthermore, it is unlikely the prospect of a simple refusal to deal is
"sufficiently grave to justify the victim's assent." The threatened party probably has a
reasonable alternative: leaving the prospective bargain and seeking an alternative
elsewhere, perhaps without arbitration.
2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.2.3.1 (footnotes omitted).
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the industry makes that same term non-negotiable, discussion on this
issue is deferred until Part IV of this Article.
The harder duress case involves situations where an employer
threatens to fire an at-will employee unless she signs an arbitration
agreement. In Standard Coffee, for instance, Babin was employed by
Standard as a sales representative.2 2 Babin had apparently been
employed pursuant to a written contract that did not contain an arbitration clause. 213 He then received a message to appear at Standard's sales
office for the purpose of signing a new employment contract.214 Babin
contended that he signed the new contract in response to threats that he
would be fired if he refused. 2 5 He further contended that he was not
permitted to review the contract with counsel before signing it.21 6
While Standard denied threatening to fire Babin, the court of appeals
accepted the trial court's determination that Babin was presented with the
choice to "either sign or be fired. 21 7 The court of appeals held that a
contract signed under such circumstances is voidable on the ground of
8
duress.

21

One's first reaction to this case may be that the court of appeals
surely reached the correct decision. If Babin is like most employed
people, his job and the income it provided was very important to him.
The threat to his job and income may have shaken him and filled him
with fear.1 9 To call such a threat "duress" seems natural.
On the other hand, we ought to be more detached in our analysis.
Suppose Standard had never mentioned a new contract with an arbitration
clause, but had simply fired Babin. Then, a few months later, Babin
asked for his job back. If Standard agreed to rehire Babin only if Babin
signed an employment arbitration agreement, would there be duress? Not
if Rust is the precedent to follow. In this hypothetical, Standard has done
just what Drexel did. It makes one term of the employment contract, the
arbitration clause, non-negotiable.
But how is the hypothetical different from the Standard Coffee case?

212. 472 So. 2d at 125.

213. See id.
214. See id.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 127.
See id.

219. "[People want to eat first
and consider legal and philosophical implications later.
The
average worker in need of a job is unlikely at the outset to balk at an arbitration clause." Stempel,
supra note 95, at 1387.
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The only difference is the amount of time between the employer
exercising its right to terminate at-will employment and its right to offer
a new employment agreement with an arbitration clause. To hold that
duress is present if the amount of time is short, but not if the amount of
time is long, is baffling.
The issue may be easier to see if we substitute another term of the
employment contract for the arbitration clause. Suppose Babin had been

entitled to three weeks of vacation per year as an at-will employee with
Standard. Further, suppose that Standard then told him that the new
company policy was only two weeks of vacation per year. Babin might
protest and Standard might persist by saying, in effect, "accept the new
terms or you're fired." Would the new employment agreement be
voidable due to duress? I do not think many courts would reach such a
holding. To do so would be to render unenforceable countless employ-

ment contracts in which the terms of at-will employment were changed
in a way that made them less favorable to the employee than they
previously had been. The terms might relate to vacation, as in the above
example, or to salary, benefits and even working conditions such as
office space, secretarial support, or coffee breaks. The crucial point here

is that an arbitration clause is a term of employment just like these other
matters.220 With respect to duress, like other contract doctrines, arbitra-

tion clauses ought to be treated like any other term of the employment
contract. 22 In sum, Standard Coffee's finding of duress is questionable

220. Some will object that the right to litigate employment disputes is a far weightier matter
than the right to a coffee break. Therefore, the argument goes, the legal standard governing an
employee's relinquishment of her right to litigate employment disputes should be more exacting than
the standard governing her relinquishment of her right to a coffee break. This seems to have been
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in PrudentialInsurance Co. ofAmerica v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994), discussed supranote 171. This reasoning is inconsistent with the FAA as presently interpreted
by the Supreme Court. See Gorman, supra note 171, at 652-53; infra Part IV.C.3.
221. If anything, the case for duress is weaker when the employer insists on an arbitration
clause than when it insists, for example, on reducing vacation time. Both changes reduce the costs
to the employer of obtaining the at-will employee's labor. This cost-reduction to the employer is
plainly a benefit-reduction to the employee with respect to a reduction in vacation time. That is not
necessarily true, however, in the case of the arbitration clause. Many employees might benefit from
an arbitration clause because it will likely reduce the costs of bringing a claim against the employer.
See PETER SIVIGLIA, EXERCISES IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 87 (1995) (stating that "[a]s a
general rule 'shallow pockets' prefer arbitration and 'deep pockets', especially when contracting with
'shallow pockets', prefer the courts"); see also William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment
DiscriminationClaims: Do You Really Have to? Do You Really Want to?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 255,
289 (1994) (concluding that lawyers who represent employees turn down cases for financial reasons;
they would take some of those cases if the forum was arbitration where the costs of getting to a
decision are lower); William M. Howard, ArbitratingEmployment Discrimination Claims: What
Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Fall 1995, at 40 (stating that
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and courts ought not to presume duress whenever an at-will employee is
told that continued employment requires an arbitration agreement.2a
3. Other Contract Defenses
Duress is, of course, not the only defense to contract enforcement.
All the contract law defenses apply to arbitration agreements like they
apply to other contracts.2 23 For example, unconscionability applies to

arbitration agreements.2 4 Courts may refuse to enforce some employment arbitration agreements on the ground that they are unconscionable,
i.e., the terms are "unreasonably favorable" to one side.225 This would
average employees' lawyer's requirements for taking a discrimination claim "included minimum
probable damages of $60,000 to $65,000, a required retainer of $3000 to $3500, and a 35%
contingent fee"); Piskorski & Ross, supra note 29, at 210 (finding that one of the disadvantages of
arbitration is that "Itihe comparative convenience and lower cost of arbitration may encourage some
employees to pursue questionable claims they would not take to court").
Christine Godsil Cooper states categorically that "management wants arbitration but
employees do not." Cooper, supra note 53, at 238. That may be an accurate generalization when
viewed ex post; once a dispute has arisen, employees, more often than employers, may seek to
litigate, rather than arbitrate. But the ex post perspective fails to capture whether employees, as a
group, benefit from the enforcement ofpre-dispute arbitration agreements. The ex post perspective
only captures whether those employees involved in disputes benefit from it. What about all those
employees who never get involved in disputes with their employers? The benefits to these employees
of enforceable arbitration agreements must be included in any cost/benefit analysis. See infra note
361 and accompanying text.
With the ex ante perspective, it appears that enforcing arbitration agreements hurts, not
employees, but employees' lawyers.
As the newspaper stories of multimillion-dollar jury awards become more frequent, the
organized plaintiff community will be less and less inclined to give up access to juries
which they believe to be sympathetic to employees and more likely to award substantial
damages. Yet for most employees bringing charges of employment discrimination, a
major jury award is an uncertain, distant, and costly remedy to seek.
Eastman & Rothenstein, supra note 52, at 605; see also Cooper, supra note 53, at 240 (stating that
a possible explanation for the battle over Gilmer "is the speculation on results, with plaintiffs'
lawyers loving and defendants' lawyers loathing juries').
222. But see Cooper, supra note 53, at 242 (concluding that "no arbitration system should be
unilaterally imposed into a workplace by an employer. The only exception to this rule should be
where the arbitration program offers additional substantive rights to employees."); Hoffman, supra
note 53, at 153 (stating that "[e]mployees who are threatened with termination if they fail to agree
prospectively to the arbitration of all claims against their employer, face an improper threat in light
of the FAA's section 1 exemption and the legislative history of civil rights legislation").
223. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
224. See Doctor'sAssocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1656; 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.3.1.1;
see also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and UnconscionabilityAfter Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
225. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.28, at 332. This is the essence of "substantive"
unconscionability. In contrast, "procedural" unconscionability deals with the process of contract
formation and, therefore, relates to the doctrine of mutual assent. Procedural unconscionability can
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not be a holding that the agreements lack voluntary consent, rather, it
would be a holding that they should not be enforced even though they
are the product of voluntary consent. 226 Advocates of the unconscionability doctrine seek, not to ensure voluntary consent, but to subordinate

it to other values. This may be the real agenda of those who incorrectly

be applied to cases in which there has been "no consent by a party to certain terms contained in
standard form agreements." Epstein, supra note 189, at 302 n.28. Procedural unconscionability,
however, goes beyond mutual assent "to encompass not only the employment of sharp practices and
the use of fine print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of
bargaining power." FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, § 4.28, at 332-33 (footnotes omitted). To the
extent procedural unconscionability goes beyond the doctrine of mutual assent, it, like substantive
unconscionability, denies enforcement to duties assumed through voluntary consent.
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that both procedural and
substantive unconscionability are required before courts will grant relief from a
challenged term. Judicial decisions have not consistently followed this principle, however,
and some courts have suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large
amount of one type of unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the
other.
Richard Craswell, Property Rules and LiabilityRules in Unconscionabilityand Related Doctrines,
60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 17 (1993).
226. HERZOG, supra note 119, at 237.
[P]eople can and do make horrible decisions, with good information, time to deliberate,
and all the rest. It's a mistake to massage the concept of voluntariness so that it does the
work a theory of paternalism should. Instead of saying, "This choice is so bad that it
wasn't voluntary," we should say, "This choice is so bad that we don't care if it was
voluntary."
Id. But see Lawrence Kalevitch, Contract, Will & Social Practice,3 J.L. & POL'Y 379, 386-87 n.11,
393, 411 (1995) (lumping duress and unconscionability together as both relating to voluntariness and
fairness).
A related contract defense, undue influence, also denies enforcement of agreements resulting
from voluntary consent. "Undue influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between them
is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (1979) (emphasis added). Because of this element
of unfairness, "undue influence, though not always so classified, falls under the general rubric of
unconscionability." Epstein, supranote 189, at 303; see also FARNSWORTH, supranote 113, § 4.27,
at 323 (characterizing undue influence as an exception to the common law's general lack of"concern
with substantive unfairness"); id. § 4.20, at 285 (providing that an important factor in showing undue
influence "is imbalance in the resulting bargain").
Other contract defenses come closer than unconscionability and undue influence in relating
to voluntariness. Misrepresentation might be so characterized. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy,
Property Rights, and Misrepresentations,12 GA. L. REV. 455, 466 (1978) (stating that "false
words ... undermine the voluntariness of the individual's conduct"); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 113, § 4.9, at 246 (referring to misrepresentation as "misleading" conduct).
The defenses of infancy, insanity and intoxication describe persons who lack the capacity
to contract. They describe persons whose voluntary consent is not afforded the same legal significance as the voluntary consent of other people. They "attempt to identify broad classes of individuals
who in general are not able to protect their own interests in negotiation." Epstein, supra note 189,
at 300.
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characterize pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements as "involuntary."' ' That possibility is pursued in Part IV.C.
C. Separability
Courts can and should use the contract law doctrines of mutual
assent and duress to ensure that arbitration is based on voluntary consent.
Doing so raises an additional issue. Who determines whether there has
been mutual assent or duress in a particular case?
Suppose, for instance, Employee sues Employer for an employmentrelated incident. Employer moves to dismiss on the ground that
Employee agreed to arbitrate all employment-related disputes. Employee
argues that she did not consent to arbitration, i.e., she did not manifest
assent to an arbitration agreement. The court could do one of two things.
One, it could decide the issue raised by Employee and relegate
Employee's claim to arbitration only if the court decides that Employee
consented to arbitrate. Two, it could immediately relegate Employee's
claim to arbitration with an order stating that if the arbitratordecides
that Employee did not consent to arbitration then the court will allow
Employee to bring her claim in court. The former procedure is required
by courts to ensure that arbitration is consensual.
To ensure that Employee's claim will not be relegated to arbitration
without her consent, a court must conclude that she consented to arbitrate
before dismissing her claim. If a court sends the issue of consent to
arbitration, the court has relegated Employee's claim to arbitration
whether Employee consented to it or not. Unfortunately, courts may do
just this." 8 The ground for doing so is the "separability" doctrine
adopted by the Supreme Court in PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.229

227. For instance, one United States senator believes "[i]t is simply unfair to require an
employee to waive, in advance, his or her statutory right to seek redress in a court of law in
exchange for employment or a promotion." 140 CONG. REC. S4266, S4267 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994)

(statement of Sen. Feingold); see also 140 CONG. REC. E1753 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement
ofRep. Schroeder) ("Mandatory arbitration represents a disturbing trend in employment law, one that

forces many workers to choose between a job or promotion and their civil rights. This is a choice
no one should be forced to make.").
228. See infra note 241.
229. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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1. PrimaPaint
In PrimaPaint,Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. ("F & C") sold
a list ofF & C's customers to Prima Paint Corporation and promised not
to sell paint to those customers for six years.2 30 F & C also promised
to act as a consultant to Prima Paint during these six years. l This
consulting agreement included an arbitration clause which relegated any
controversies or claims arising out of the agreement to arbitration.2 32
Prima Paint did not make the payments provided for in the consulting
133
agreement. Prima Paint raised the defense of misrepresentation
contending "that F & C had fraudulently represented that it was solvent
while in fact it was
and able to perform its contractual obligations,"
23 4
insolvent and intended to file for bankruptcy.
F & C served upon Prima Paint a "'notice of intention to arbitrate.' ' '235 Prima Paint filed suit, seeking rescission of the consulting
agreement (due to the alleged misrepresentation) and an order enjoining
F & C from proceeding with arbitration 36 F & C cross-moved to stay
Prima Paint's suit pending arbitration."' The Supreme Court affirmed
a lower court's order granting F & C's motion, thus staying Prima
Paint's suit pending arbitration.2 38 The Court concluded that
arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are "separable" from the
contracts in which they are embedded, and that where no claim is
made that fraud was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad
arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that
the contract itself was induced by fraud 3 9
This separability doctrine has been applied beyond misrepresentation to

230. See id. at 397.
231. See id.
232. See id.
at 398.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
at 398-99.
236. See id.
at 399.
237. See id.
at 406-07.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 402. According to the Court, ifa party seeking to litigate, rather than arbitrate, argues
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself--an issue which goes to the
"making" of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.
But the statutory language [of Section Four] does not permit the federal court to consider
claims [like Prima Paint's] of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.
Id. at 403-04 (footnote omitted).
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other contract defenses, including duress.240 It has even been applied
to mutual assent. 241
In Prima Paint,the Court sent to arbitration the issue of whether
Prima Paint's consent to the consulting agreement was fraudulently
induced by F & C. 242 As consent to the consulting agreement includes
consent to the arbitration clause in that agreement, the Court sent to
arbitration the issue of whether Prima Paint's agreement to arbitratewas
fraudulently induced.243 Similarly, a case applying Prima Paint's
separability doctrine to duress sends to arbitration the issue of whether
a party's consent to arbitration is induced by duress.2 " In other words,
it sends to arbitration the issue of whether a party's consent to arbitration
was voluntary. It relegates a dispute to arbitration without first determining that the parties had voluntarily consented to arbitration. Applying
separability to duress then, prevents courts from ensuring that arbitration
proceeds only through voluntary consent. Applying separability to mutual
assent goes even further. It prevents courts from ensuring that arbitration
is consensual at all.
The Prima Paint Court claimed that its result was compelled by
Section Four of the FAA, which reads in pertinent part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure,
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall
proceed summarily to the trial thereof.245

240. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 & n.1 1 (5th
Cir. 1981); 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.2.

241. See Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1991);
Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. See PrimaPaint,388 U.S. at 404.
243. See id. at 403-04.
244. See, e.g., Hickman v. Paine Webber, Inc., No. 1:96-4CV-0273, 1996 WL 515276, at *1,
*4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 1996).
245. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). As the Court in Prima Paint recognized:
Section 4 does not expressly relate to situations like the present in which a stay is sought
of a federal action in order that arbitration may proceed. But it is inconceivable that
Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon which party to the arbitration
agreement first invokes the assistance of a federal court.
388 U.S. at 404. Motions, like F & C's, for a stay pending arbitration are brought under Section
Three of the FAA which provides that a court shall grant such a stay "upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in [the] suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under [a written agreement]." 9
U.S.C. § 3.
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The Court correctly read Section Four's use of the terms "agreement for
arbitration" and "arbitration agreement" to refer only to the arbitration
clause in isolation and not to the contract containing the clause (the
"container contract"). 246 This reading, however, does not compel the
Court's conclusion that courts should hear only challenges to the
arbitration clause in isolation and not challenges to the container contract
as a whole. "[N]othing would have prevented the [C]ourt in PrimaPaint
from holding that the making of an arbitration clause is in issue
whenever the making of the agreement containing it is in issue. 24 7
This is what the Court should have held, because the making of an
arbitration clause is in issue whenever the making of the container
contract is in issue. If Prima Paint's consent to the consulting agreement
was fraudulently induced then its consent to the arbitration clause, and
every other clause, in that agreement was fraudulently induced.
The separability doctrine is a legal fiction pretending that when a
party alleges it has formed a contract containing an arbitration clause,
that party actually alleges it has formed two contracts. In addition to the
contract really alleged to have been formed, the separability doctrine
pretends that the party also alleges a fictional contract consisting of just
the arbitration clause, but no other terms. Enforcing this fictional contract
deprives arbitration of its basis in voluntary consent, because the fictional
contract lacks a basis in voluntary consent. Had a contract consisting of
just the arbitration clause been presented to the parties, they might have
given their voluntary consent to it. But, that is just speculation. And
imposing duties based on speculations about what the parties would have
voluntarily consented to is profoundly different from imposing duties
based on what the parties did, in fact, voluntarily consent to. The former
has no place in contract law while the latter is the essence of contract
24
law. S

246. If these statutory terms referred to the container contract, the first provision in the abovequoted portion of Section Four could never apply because every breach of the container contract
would constitute a 'failure to comply therewith,'" i.e., with the container contract. 2 MACNEIL ET
AL., supra note 13, § 15.2, at 15:23 n.13. "For example, an alleged breach of warranty would be
such a failure." Id. Thus, no case would ever be ordered to arbitration. The second provision in the
above-quoted portion of Section Four would always apply because every breach of the container
contract would constitute "'failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same,"' i.e., the container
contract. Id. "Hence every dispute would be tried summarily by the court. The arbitration clause
would be nullified in every case, and the FAA would have been a nullity." Id.
247. Id.
248. Contract law's "gap-filling" of incomplete contracts might be understood as enforcing
speculation about what parties would have voluntarily consented to. Randy Barnett refutes this posi-
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Reconsider Employee, who argues that she should be allowed to
assert her claim in court because she did not consent to arbitration.
Suppose that Employer contends that the arbitration clause is contained
in an employment contract including terms regarding salary, benefits, and
vacation, in addition to the arbitration clause. Under the separability
doctrine, if Employee argues that she did not consent to the container
contract, i.e., the employment contract, the court will dismiss Employee's
claim and send the consent issue to arbitration. Only if Employee argues
that she did consent to the container contract, but did not consent to the
arbitration clause, will the court decide the consent issue itself. This is
simply ludicrous.
2. Departures from Prima Paint
The separability doctrine of Prima Paint "continues to thrive. 249
On the other hand, there are "a wide range of cases where PrimaPaint
issues were in fact present, but where the courts have refused to apply
them or simply ignored their presence.""
Many courts have simply
25
been unwilling to follow Prima Paint. '
An example of such a case is Jolley v. Welch.252 In Jolley, investors sued their securities broker, Paine Webber, which sought to relegate
the claims to arbitration on the ground that there were arbitration clauses
in the broker-customer agreements the investors had signed.253 The
district court granted Paine Webber's motion, staying the claims, with
respect to all the investors except one.2" The district court allowed the
one investor, Mills, to pursue her claim in court because Paine Webber
failed to introduce into evidence an agreement to arbitrate executed by
Mills.1

5

On appeal, Paine Webber argued that the district court erred in
deciding the consent issue, rather than sending it to arbitration.2 6 Paine
Webber's position was solidly supported by Prima Paint's separability
tion and explains that parties do, in fact, often consent to default rules. See generally Barnett, supra
note 176. Consent to be legally bound is "a necessary element of a prima facie contractual
obligation," id. at 864, and is, in most circumstances, best interpreted to include consent to the

default rules of whatever court has jurisdiction of the dispute. See id. at 864-67.
249.
250.
251.
252.

2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.1.
2 id. § 15.3.2.
See 2 id. § 15.3.3.2 n.38.
904 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1990).

253.
254.
255.
256.

See id. at 990.
See id.
See id. at 993.
See id. at 993-94.
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doctrine. Prima Paint allows courts to hear arguments going to the
making of the arbitration clause itself, but not to the contract generally.257 Mills argued that she did not consent to the contract generally."' Her argument that she did not sign the broker-customer agreement pertains to the arbitration clause no more than to any other term in
that agreement. The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's
decision holding that Mills' claim could not be relegated to arbitration
unless and until a court determined that Mills had, in fact, consented to
25 9
arbitration.
20
Can Jolley and similar cases be reconciled with Prima Paint?
One distinction between Prima Paint on one hand, and Jolley and the
Employee hypothetical on the other, is that Prima Paint applied the
separability doctrine to a defense to enforcement, i.e., an argument that
a contract was formed but was voidable due to a misrepresentation.2 61
Jolley and the Employee hypothetical apply separability to mutual assent,
i.e., an argument that no contract was formed at all.262 The separability
doctrine could be confined so that it does not apply to arguments
disputing formation of a contract.263 If the doctrine were narrowed this
way, a court would--before relegating a dispute to arbitration-hear, not
only arguments denying mutual assent, but also arguments that the
parties' agreement is not a "contract" because it is void.2 4 As Lord
Chancellor Simon put it:
If the dispute is as to whether the contract which contains the [arbitration] clause has ever been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to
arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever
entered into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in
257. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
258. See Jolley, 904 F.2d at 993-94.
259. See id. at 994.
260. This question is considered and answered "no" in 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 15.3.3.2. There is no principle that "will sort out the cases into a meaningful pattern. The law is
a hodgepodge in search of a currently nonexistent order." 2 id. § 15.3.3.3.
261. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403-04.
262. See Jolley, 904 F.2d at 993.
263. See, e.g., W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBrrATION § 5.04 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that "a distinction must be recognized with respect to
claims that the entire contract does not even exist. Such claims are for courts to resolve, because the
party denying that it ever entered into contract also denies that it ever agreed to arbitration"); see
also 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.3.2 n.38 (citing cases making the above distinction).
264. A "void contract" is a contradiction in terms. Arguments that the parties' agreement is not
a contract include arguments based on illegality, (e.g., the contract is one for prostitution), incapacity
(e.g., one party was three years old), and certain forms of duress (duress by physical compulsion)
and misrepresentation (fraud in the factum). See, e.g., 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.3.2.
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the submission [to arbitration]. Similarly, if one party to the alleged
contract is contending that it is void ab initio (because, for example, the
making of such a contract. is illegal), the arbitration clause cannot
operate, for on this view the clause itself is also void.265

This narrowed separability doctrine would only preclude courts from
hearing arguments that the contract is voidable. 26

Narrowing PrimaPaint'sseparability doctrine so that it only applies
to voidable-contract arguments would be an improvement, but why stop
there? Why distinguish between no-contract arguments and voidablecontract arguments? A practical reason not to preserve the separability
doctrine for voidable-contract arguments is that it is often difficult to
distinguish no-contract arguments from voidable-contract arguments.267
More importantly, preserving the separability doctrine for voidablecontract arguments undermines what the contract law defenses protect. 268 An example of a voidable contract is an arbitration agreement
Employee signs with a gun to her head.269 Preserving the separability

doctrine for voidable-contract arguments imposes upon Employee a duty
to arbitrate whether a gun was in fact used as alleged. Imposing such a

duty violates a fundamental principle of contract law. It enforces a duty
265. Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 337, 343 (H.L. 1942).
266. This Article refers to this as a "narrowed" separability doctrine because the current
separability doctrine makes no distinction between no-contract arguments and voidable-contract
arguments.
Once it is established, as it was in Prima Paint,that "agreement for arbitration"
in FAA § 4 means "arbitration clause" rather than "agreement containing an arbitration
clause," the court is concerned only about the "making" of the arbitration clause. We
must add to that the Prima Paint conclusion that an issue going to the making of the
entire contract, rather than one going to the making of the arbitration clause itself treated
separately, is not an issue concerned only with the making of the arbitration clause.
With the foregoing combination, nothing in the language of the FAA or of Prima
Paintlogically permits distinguishing any of the no-contract-was-made [cases] from fraud
in the inducement or the many other bases which have been held to be under the Prima
Paintrule.
2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.3.1. The court in UnionmutualStock Life Insurance Co.
ofAmerica v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 774 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1985) stated that
[t]he teaching of PrimaPaint is that a federal court must not remove from the arbitrators
consideration of a substantive challenge to a contract unless there has been an
independent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself. The basis of the
underlying challenge to the contract does not alter the severability principle.
Id. at 529.
267. See 2 MACNEIL Er AL., supra note 13, § 15.3.3.2.
268. See 2 id.
269. See 2 id. § 15.3.4 n.74 (discussing ramifications of the Prima Paint holding with respect
to duress imposed by a buyer on a seller to sign a draft contract with an arbitration clause when the
seller did not want to otherwise sign contract due to disagreement over price to be paid).
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assumed through coerced, not voluntary, consent.2 70
As Prima Paint's separability doctrine is not compelled by FAA
Section Four, the Supreme Court should overrule it. If the Supreme Court
does not do so, the FAA should be amended to do so. 271 When one
party contends that the arbitration clause in a container contract requires
a claim to be arbitrated, but the other party contends that an enforceable
container contract was never formed, courts should decide whether the
container contract has been formed and if so, whether there is a defense
to its enforcement.272 Only if courts conclude that an enforceable

270. The separability doctrine could be further narrowed to apply only to some voidable-contract
arguments. For instance, the separability doctrine could be confined to apply to arguments, like
Prima Paint's, based on misrepresentation, but not those based on duress. Again, this would be an
improvement, but why distinguish among defenses? Are some defenses more important than others?
To say the separability doctrine should preclude courts from hearing arguments based on
misrepresentation, but not duress, denigrates the misrepresentation defense. In effect, it says "you
consented, and you will be bound by that consent even though it may have been induced by a
misrepresentation." This negates the misrepresentation defense which operates to ensure that contract
law enforces only duties assumed through consent not induced by misrepresentation. Applying the
separability doctrine to misrepresentation arguments imposes the duty to arbitrate on some whose
consent was induced by a misrepresentation.
The failure to sharply distinguish consent induced by misrepresentation from consent-not-soinduced is responsible for the mistaken conception of the separability doctrine as a default rule. See,
e.g., JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU, & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 615 (2d ed. 1996). A default rule is a rule the parties can
avoid by forming an enforceable contract. See Barnett, supra note 176, at 825. In contrast, a
mandatory rule is one that trumps an otherwise enforceable contract. FARNSWORTH, supra note 113,
§ 1.10. Therefore, the concept of a default rule presupposes rules on what constitutes an "enforceable
contract." And the separability doctrine is such a rule. It, along with other law, specifies what
constitutes an enforceable contract to avoid the default rule that disputes are resolved by litigation,
not arbitration.
Cases purporting to treat the separability doctrine as a default rule compel arbitration "only
after indulging in mock deference to the parties' presumed 'intention' to entrust to the arbitrator the
question whether the overall agreement had been induced by fraud." MURRAY, RAU, & SHERMAN,
supra, at 615. The error here is deferring to what the parties consented to without previously
determining whether that consent is significant, i.e., whether it was given in the absence of a contract
defense. These errors can be traced to Prima Paint itself, which said its separability doctrine applies
"where there is no evidence that the contracting parties intended to withhold [the misrepresentation]
issue from arbitration." 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
271. Repealing the separability doctrine in United States law would not prevent its applicability
to international arbitration governed by foreign law. Separability, often called "autonomy" of the
arbitration clause, is "a conceptual cornerstone of international arbitration." CRAIG ET AL., supra note
263, § 5.04; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 193-94 (1994).
272. As Jeffrey Stempel puts it:
[W]hen the party resisting arbitration raises one of the.. . consent-based defenses going
to the issrue of contract formation-the very existence of the contract-the court should
adjudicate these defenses....
... If the contract was never formed due to lack of consent, the arbitration
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container contract has been formed, i.e., that the parties have consented
to the container contract in circumstances in which consent is significant,
should the parties be relegated to arbitration.
This procedure-a court resolving disputes over whether the parties
have formed an enforceable container contract before an arbitrator
resolves the merits of the claims-would make arbitration a slower and

costlier means of resolving disputes than it is under the separability
doctrine. 73 It would also entail a court resolving issues that will often be

agreement contained within this "noncontract" must be equally lacking in force and
cannot justify allowing the arbitrator to adjudicate the defense.
Stempel, supra note 95, at 1457-58 (footnote omitted). This is correct in substance although,
technically, most defenses do not preclude contract formation. Rather, they make a contract voidable
at the party's option.
Stempel proposes his own version of the separability doctrine. Stempel believes that contract
defenses to arbitration agreements should usually be decided by courts, but he makes an exception
for cases in which proof of the defense would be "ineffective to undermine the resisting party's
consent to arbitration." Id. at 1456. As an example of such a case, Stempel cites Prima Paint itself,
in which Prima Paint alleged that it had been induced to enter into a consulting agreement by
F & C's misrepresentations of financial solvency. Stempel argues that the Court properly relegated
Prima Paint to arbitration without first determining whether its consent had been induced by
misrepresentation. In support of his argument, Stempel claims
it is doubtful that Prima Paint could have introduced evidence to show that, as a
commercial company that probably had agreed to hundreds of contracts providing for
arbitration, it really would not have consented to the arbitration provision had it been
better apprised of F&C's financial problems. Rather, Prima Paint was really alleging that
it would not have consented to do business with F&C had it known all the facts.
Id. Stempel relies on his speculation that Prima Paint "would have" consented to the arbitration
clause whether or not F & C made a misrepresentation. Even if Stempel speculates correctly, his
proposal negates the misrepresentation defense which operates to ensure that contract law enforces
only duties assumed through consent not induced by misrepresentation. To avoid enforcing other
duties, courts should not speculate about what a party "would have" consented to in the absence of
misrepresentation. That the party argues it did not, in fact, consent in the absence of misrepresentation is what matters. If Prima Paint did not consent in the absence of misrepresentation to arbitrate
disputes arising out of the consulting agreement with F & C, it should not be relegated to arbitration,
even if every contract it has ever entered into contains an arbitration clause. If Prima Paint did not
form an enforceable consulting agreement with F & C then it should not be compelled to arbitrate
disputes arising out of such an agreement.
Furthermore, Stempel's proposal would add another difficult issue to arbitration disputes.
Imagine the arguments. The party resisting arbitration argues that its consent to the container contract
was induced by misrepresentation or that another defense to enforcement applies. The party seeking
arbitration cannot just deny that these defenses are present; it must also assert that even if the
defense is present, the resisting party "would have" consented to arbitration had it not been present.
273. PrimaPaintgave two reasons for adopting the separability doctrine. The Court stated that
separability "honor[s] the plain meaning of the statute [and] the unmistakably clear congressional
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts." 388 U.S. at 404. Since the meaning of the statute
does not compel the adoption of the separability doctrine, it is plausible that the justices were
primarily motivated by concerns about delay and cost.
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be intimately intertwined with the merits that will go to the arbitrator if
the court finds that the parties have formed an enforceable container
contract.27 4 For example, in Prima Paint, if a court had sent Prima
Paint's claim to arbitration only after determining that Prima Paint's
consent to the consulting agreement was not induced by misrepresentation, the court would have already decided much of the dispute it was
sending to arbitration. In short, overruling Prima Paint will come at a
price to both disputants and adjudicators. That price, however, must be
paid to make the law well-suited to ensure that arbitration is based on significant consent.
Is the Supreme Court willing to pay that price? Maybe so. After all,
the Court's arbitration decisions over the last twenty years have been
remarkably faithful to the principle that courts should relegate claims to
arbitration when, and only when, contract law analysis would call for
that.27 5 Overruling Prima Paint is the last major step needed to bring
arbitration law in conformity with this principle. If the Court overrules
Prima Paint it will have completed its twenty-year project of making
arbitration law a branch of contract law.
While the Court's strongly pro-arbitration decisions of the last
twenty years are remarkably consistent with a contractual theory of
arbitration, they are also largely consistent with a "docket-clearing"

274. See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supranote 13, § 15.3.3.3.
275. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 1212, 1214 (1995)
(stating that if contracting parties agree to include punitive damages, the FAA ensures that their
agreement will be enforced); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 836 (1995)
(enforcing agreement to arbitrate consumer claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 25 (1991) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate employment discrimination claim); Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476-77 (1989)
(FAA does not preempt California arbitration law when parties choose California law in choice-oflaw clause); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (state law precluding enforcement of
agreement to arbitrate California Labor Code claim is preempted by FAA); Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (enforcing, in domestic context, agreement to arbitrate
securities claim); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)
("'[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.") (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (enforcing, in an international context, agreement to arbitrate antitrust
claim); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1985) (stating that where only
some claims are arbitrable, agreement to arbitrate will be enforced with respect to those claims);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 8 (1984) (holding that a state law making a claim nonarbitrable is preempted by FAA); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1,24 (1983) (FAA is substantive, not procedural, law governing in federal and state courts); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (enforcing, in international context, agreement
to arbitrate securities claim).
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theory of arbitration. That is, they are largely consistent with the view
that courts favor arbitration as a way to reduce their caseloads whether
or not parties have contracted for it.276 The Supreme Court can demonstrate that it, like the FAA, 277 is concerned with contract enforcement, 27 not docket-clearing, by reversing Prima Paint's separability
doctrine. Until then, the arbitration boom fostered by the Supreme Court
will remain vulnerable to charges that it is more about clearing dockets
than enforcing contracts.
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF VOLUNTARY CONSENT
In Part III of this Article, I argued that contemporary arbitration law,
with the exception of the separability doctrine, is well-suited to ensure
that disputes are resolved by arbitration only when the disputants have
voluntarily consented to that. The argument was that contract law
enforces only duties assumed through voluntary consent and that
arbitration law is essentially a branch of contract law. Therefore,
arbitration law, with full use of the contract doctrines of mutual assent
and duress, enforces the duty to arbitrate only when the party resisting
arbitration has voluntarily consented to arbitrate. This Part argues,
however, that legal analysis ought to consider more than whether the
duty to arbitrate was assumed through voluntary consent. It also ought
to consider the baseline rights underlying the determination that consent
is voluntary.

276. As Ian Macneil has observed:
One cannot immerse oneself in the arbitration cases without coming to the conclusion that
a major force driving the Court is docket-clearing pure and simple. That is, the Court is
motivated to reduce the cases having to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the
federal judicial system. If this means overriding the consent principle of the [FAA],
sobeit ....
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 172.

277. The Court has stated that
[tihe FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate," and to place such agreements '"upon the same footing as other
contracts."' While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage the
expeditious resolution of disputes, its passage "was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered."
Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted).
278. "Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply
to make the contracting party live up to his agreement .... An arbitration agreement is placed upon
the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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A.

Voluntariness, Coercion, and Baselines

Part III distinguishes cases in which an employee's consent to
arbitration is voluntary from those in which her consent is coerced. It
does so on the premises that (1) contract law routinely distinguishes
voluntarily-assumed duties from coercively-assumed duties and (2)
contract law's method of making this distinction--application of the
duress defense-is the best method for arbitration cases.279 While the
duress defense routinely distinguishes voluntarily-assumed duties from
coercively-assumed duties, it does so against a baseline of rights

established by non-contract law.28 Whether the assumption of a duty
is voluntary or coerced will in some cases depend on which baseline is
specified by non-contract law. To speak meaningfully about voluntariness
and coercion requires that one have previously identified this baseline.2 8'

279. See supra Part III.A.
280. "'Contract' analysis assumes that there is already a prior assignment of entitlements so that
the parties to the contract have something to exchange." Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and
Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). "One's ability to participate in exchanges depends upon
one's initial assignment of property rights.... [Tihis initial assignment of property rights is not
derived from the participants' consent. It antedates consensual transactions... "'Id.at 18. "We need
some independent criterion of justice (other than freedom of contract) to determine what the initial
distribution of property rights should be." Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 STAN. L. REv. 611,649 (1988). "[Elvery transaction takes place against a background of property
rights." Id. at 651; see also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD.
L. REv. 563, 568 (1982) (discussing baseline changes in the "regime of freedom of contract").
281. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 217 ("[T]he structure of coercion discourse
presupposes that A and B [(individuals)] have certain obligations and rights which establish a
background against which A's proposals are understood."); id. at 222 ("IT]he coerciveness of
proposals is all in the baseline."); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 25
(1993) (stating there is widespread agreement that a discussion of coercion depends upon the proper
identification of baselines, i.e., "the initial positions against which the propriety of subsequent
individual or government action can be judged'); FRIED, supra note 133, at 97 ("A proposal is not
coercive if it offers what the proponent has a right to offer or not as he chooses. It is coercive if it
proposes a wrong to the object of the proposal."); ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
262 (1974) ("Other people's actions place limits on one's available opportunities. Whether this
makes one's resulting action non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to act
as they did."); Brilmayer, supra note 280, at 3 ("Consent is about making choices; the fairness of
holding an individual to a choice made, however, depends on the legitimacy of limiting him or her
to a particular set of choices.").
This view has not persuaded all philosophers. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt
Chamberlain: How PatternsPreserve Liberty, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION (John
Arthur & William Shaw eds., 1978); XIV NOMOS: COERCION, supra note 120 (variety of
philosophical views on coercion); David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
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Suppose, for example, Seller offered to deliver to Buyer an
identified computer if Buyer promised to pay Seller $1,000. If Buyer
accepted the offer, was Buyer's assumption of a duty to pay $1,000
voluntary or coerced? That depends on the baseline rights prior to
Buyer's assumption of the duty to pay Seller. Perhaps shortly before their
conversation Seller stole the computer from Buyer.28 2 If so, according
to the baseline rights specified by property law, Buyer owned the
computer, i.e., Buyer had a right to it. The property law baseline in this
case is that Buyer had a right to the computer and a right to the money.
Seller did not have a right to either. Therefore, Buyer's assumption of the
duty to pay the money to Seller for the computer was not voluntary.
Buyer's consent to the transfer of $1,000 from Buyer to Seller was
coerced. If Seller delivered the computer to Buyer, Buyer refused to pay
Seller, and Seller sued Buyer for breach of contract, Buyer would have
a duress defense because Buyer's consent was induced by a threat to
commit a crime or tort.283
This is an easy "duress of goods" case. 2 ' Buyer's duress defense,
however, rests on property law. If, according to property law, Seller
owned the computer before Buyer consented to pay Seller for it, then
Buyer's assumption of that duty was voluntary.28 Buyer had no duress
defense because Seller's threat, to retain possession of the computer
unless Buyer pays $1,000, is neither a crime nor a tort 86 It is neither
a crime nor a tort because the property law baseline gave Seller the right
to the computer. The same threat, in the same factual context, can be a
crime/tort or not. Whether it is or not turns on the legal context, the
baseline rights. Therefore, the duress defense turns on this baseline of
rights specified by non-contract law. In other words, the distinction

121, 141-44 (1981). It does, however, "captureo the theory of coercion that characterizes virtually
the entire corpus of American law." WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 201.
282. Under these circumstances, our conversation might be characterized as Seller demanding
a ransom payment for releasing the hostage computer.
283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. b (1979) (stating that refusing to
return stolen goods to their owner is both a crime and a tort).
284. Such cases can be found as far back as Astley v. Reynolds, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732).
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 493(d) (1932); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 133, § 9-5;
John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-AnEssay in Perspective,45 MICH. L. REv. 253,255-56 (1947).
285. The "baseline approach to coercion is fundamentally neutral with respect to the content
of [an individual's] rights." WERTHEIMER, supra note 120, at 218; see also MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 23 (1987) (labeling this aspect of the baseline approach to
coercion as "hopelessly confused").
286. Assume there were no other improper threats or physical compulsion. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-176 (1979).
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between voluntarily-assumed duties and coercively-assumed duties turns
on this baseline.
B.

Employment Arbitration

Having determined that the distinction between voluntarily-assumed
duties and coercively-assumed duties presupposes a baseline of rights
specified by non-contract law, one can apply this insight to employment
arbitration. Among my Article's goals in doing so is to suggest that
many of the people who criticize the enforcement of pre-dispute
employment arbitration agreements do so because they are dissatisfied
with the non-contract law baselines underlying such agreements. These
people miss the mark when they criticize these agreements as coerced.
As Part III explains, these agreements, thanks to routine application of
the duress defense, are voluntary. 7 The problem is not voluntariness;
it is the underlying baseline of rights specified by non-contract law.
Discussion of employment arbitration, and other arbitration, should keep
concerns about ensuring voluntariness, which are concerns endemic to all
contracts, distinct from concerns about the non-contract law underlying
arbitration agreements in particular.
In Part III, I address concerns about voluntariness, i.e., contract law.
The remainder of this Part addresses the non-contract law baselines
underlying employment arbitration. This discussion of these baselines is
skeletal. Mostly, I identify baselines and then simply accept, with little
argument, that they are good baselines. There is one baseline, however,
that I criticize. That is the baseline specified by securities law; a baseline
underlying employment arbitration in the securities industry, but not in
other industries. To distinguish that baseline from the baselines
underlying other employment arbitration, I use four hypotheticals.
First, suppose that Employer refuses to hire a job applicant
("Applicant") unless Applicant signs an arbitration agreement. The
arbitration clause is a non-negotiable term of the employment contract.
If Applicant consents to arbitration has she done so voluntarily or under
coercion? That question, when asked as a matter of positive law rather
than philosophy, is the same as asking whether Applicant has a duress
defense. 288 And that depends on whether or not Employer threatened

287. See supra Part III.B.2.
288. See supra Part III.B.2.
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a crime or tort.289 Employer's communication to Applicant is, in substance: "If you don't agree to arbitration, I will refrain from hiring you."
If Applicant consents to arbitration, her consent is induced by
Employer's "threat" to refrain from hiring her.29
If refraining from hiring Applicant was a crime or tort then
Applicant's consent would have been induced by duress. To put it
another way, if the baseline rights specified by non-contract law gave
Applicant a right to be hired by Employer then Applicant's consent
would have been coerced. In fact, refraining from hiring Applicant is
neither a crime nor a tort; the baseline rights specified by non-contract
law do not give Applicant a right to a job offer from Employer.
Therefore, Applicant's consent to the employment agreement with an
arbitration clause was not induced by duress. Her consent was voluntary,
not coerced.29'
For the second hypothetical, add to the first hypothetical an
additional fact. Suppose that Applicant wants to work in, and is trained
to work in, a particular industry and that Employer is one of a number
of potential employers in that industry. Not only does Employer make
the arbitration clause a non-negotiable condition of employment, all
employers in this industry do likewise. They do so without agreement
among themselves; each independently decides that it will not hire
anyone who does not agree to arbitration. If Applicant consents to
arbitration in a contract with an employer in this industry, has she done
so voluntarily or under coercion? Again, that question is the same as
asking whether she has a duress defense. And that depends on whether
Employer threatened a crime or tort.
As in the first hypothetical, Employer's threat was to refrain from
hiring Applicant. Refraining from hiring Applicant does not become a
crime or tort simply because all other employers in the industry refuse

289. None of the other grounds for duress are present because no one "physically compelled"
Applicant to sign the arbitration agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174
(1979). Nor did Employer threaten the Applicant with anything improper. See id. § 176. Assume that
none of these other grounds exists in the hypotheticals to follow.
290. "In effect, with a mandatory arbitration provision, the employee gives up the right to settle
a dispute with the employer in court in order to obtain or keep work." John A. Gray, Have the Foxes
Become the Guardiansof the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Predispute Mandatory
Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 113, 118 (1992).
291. This goes a long way to answering the question, raised in a discussion of employment
arbitration, why "'public pressure on choice [is called] coercion, [yet] private pressure is freedom'?"
Cooper, supranote 53, at 221 (quoting Howard Lesnick, The Consciousnessof Work and the Values
ofAmerican Labor Law, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 845 (1983) (book review)). The answer follows from
the baseline rights.
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to hire anyone who does not agree to arbitrate. In other words, the
baseline rights specified by non-contract law do not give Applicant a
right to a job offer without an arbitration clause from an employer in this
industry. Therefore, Applicant's consent to the employment agreement
with an arbitration clause was not induced by duress. Her consent was
voluntary, not coerced.
For the third hypothetical, add to the second hypothetical an

additional fact. Suppose again that all employers in this industry make
the arbitration clause a non-negotiable condition of employment. But now
suppose they do so through agreement among themselves. They form a
trade association and the association's rules require each member
employer to hire only employees who agree to arbitrate. If Applicant
consents to arbitration in a contract with an employer in this industry has
she done so voluntarily or under coercion? Again, this question is the
same as asking whether she has a duress defense. And that depends on
whether Employer threatened a crime or tort.
As in the previous hypotheticals, Employer's threat was to refrain
from hiring Applicant. Refraining from hiring Applicant might be a
crime or tort when combined with the sort of agreement formed by this
industry's employers. Performance by Employer of an agreement among
employers to refrain from hiring those who do not agree to arbitrate
might violate the antitrust laws."92 If so, Applicant's consent to the

292. An agreement among employers (outside the context of collective-bargaining) to fix wages
would likely be an antitrust violation. In Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), Judge Mansfield denied a motion to dismiss a complaint by securities employees that their
employers had agreed among themselves to reduce the commissions to be paid to their employees.
There can be little doubt about the fact that if a group of employers, as the
complaint here alleges, were allowed, not as part of a collective bargaining agreement,
to agree together to reduce the commissions paid to their respective employees, they
would have the same power to restrain competition as is inherent in a price-fixing
agreement.
Id. at 606-07; accord Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[C]ollective
employer action to regulate employee compensation, outside the context of a collective bargaining
situation, would constitute price fixing.'), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975).
The agreement to hire only those who agree to arbitrate might be analogous, although
agreement among employers on this one term of the employment contract leaves all other terms
(including wages) to be determined competitively. "[A]n agreement among competitors to insist on
an arbitration clause in contracts with a category of employees is [not] a per se violation of the
antitrust laws." Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1978). The Second Circuit held that
such an agreement among securities firms was "within the rule of reason, quite apart from the effect
of the Securities Exchange Act." Id. The court went on to state, however, that "we need not rest our
decision solely on this ground in light of' precedent holding that the Exchange Act requires antitrust
laws to be applied more forgivingly to the securities industry. Id. at 356; accordDickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785-88 (1st Cir. 1971); see also Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building and Constr. Trades
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employment contract with the arbitration clause was induced by duress.
Her consent was coerced. If, on the other hand, Employer's threatened
action does not violate the antitrust laws, Applicant's consent was not
induced by duress. It was voluntary.
The fourth and final hypothetical is the same as the third, with an
additional fact. There is a law prohibiting any employer from entering
this industry without joining the trade association, the rules of which
require each of its members to hire only employees who agree to
arbitrate. If Applicant consents to arbitration in a contract with Employer
in this industry, she has not done so under duress because Employer did
not threaten a crime or tort. While refraining from hiring Applicant might
be a crime or tort when combined with the sort of agreement considered
in the third hypothetical, it is clearly not a crime or tort in the circumstances of the fourth hypothetical. This crucial difference between the
third and fourth hypotheticals exists even though the situation Applicant
faces is the same in each hypothetical: she cannot work in the industry
unless she agrees to arbitrate. In the third hypothetical, Applicant's
predicament might have been caused by a violation of her rights. In the
fourth hypothetical, her predicament was clearly not caused by a
violation of her rights.
In the fourth hypothetical, Applicant's rights are not violated by
Employer's refusal to hire her without an arbitration clause even though
every employer in the industry makes a similar refusal. What the
employers are doing is neither a crime nor a tort. In fact, it would be a
crime to hire Applicant without an arbitration clause. Not only does the
law permit Employer to hire Applicant with an arbitration clause, it
prohibits Employer from hiring Applicant without one. In other words,
the baseline rights specified by non-contract law do not give Applicant
a right to accept from an employer in this industry an employment offer
without an arbitration clause. The law requiring employer membership
Council, 443 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that the adoption of multi-employer group

insurance and pension plans, outside of a collective bargaining agreement, did not constitute a
violation of antitrust laws).
[A] per se prohibition of all multi-employer combinations which have any attenuated or
incidental impact on wages would be "such a sweeping statement" that it would "fail to
anticipate every situation." We are not, in this case, concerned with the right of

employers to "band together for joint action in fixing the wages to be paid by each
employer"--the issue which plagued Judge Mansfield [in Cordova], when we review
ABC's insurance and retirement plans. Rather, we are concerned with the right of
employers to band together for joint action in establishing life, sickness, and disability
insurance benefits ....

Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
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in the trade association denies Applicant this right.
Here is a baseline that should be changed. Employers and employees
who each consent to an employment contract without an arbitration
clause should have the right to form such a contract regardless of the
industry they are in.293 The baseline in the fourth hypothetical compels
employees and employers to choose between their right to litigate
employment disputes and their wish to pursue their livelihoods in a
particular industry. They should not be put to that choice.
The freedom "to engage in any of the common occupations of life"
is part of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 4 It
cannot, therefore, be deprived without due process of law. 95 It is now
routinely deprived, however, with due process of law, by occupational
licensing laws. A law of the sort described in the fourth hypothetical is
an occupational licensing law. It conditions a license to engage in the
pertinent occupation on the relinquishment of one's right to litigate
employment disputes.2 96 I contend that occupational licensing laws
ought not to include, among the conditions for receiving a license, an
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes.297
C. Securities Employment Arbitration
The fourth hypothetical depicts the current securities industry. Each
employer in the securities industry makes the arbitration clause a nonnegotiable term of employment.298 These employers are compelled to
do so by law that requires them to hire only employees who agree to
arbitrate.299 In other words, the securities laws constitute an occupational licensing system that conditions a license to be a securities
employee on the relinquishment of one's right to litigate employment
disputes. Two of the most highly esteemed judges of our era, Henry
Friendly and Richard Posner, disagree with this characterization of the

293. See infra Part IV.C.3.
294. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). See generally J.R.R., II, Note, Due
ProcessLimitationson OccupationalLicensing,59 VA. L. REV. 1097 (1973) (discussing due process
limitations with regard to occupational licensing schemes).
295. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs., 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
296. See J.R.R., II, supra note 294, at 1098-99.
297. See infra Part IV.C.

293. "[E]ven if[a securities employee] were to have offers of employment from more than one
firm, shopping around to find one that does not require arbitration would be to no avail: it is an
industry-wide practice, with no opportunity for individual modification." 140 CONG. REC. E1753
(daily ed. August 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Markey). See infra Part W.C.l.
299. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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securities laws as an occupational licensing scheme,"' so this Article
goes into some detail in this subsection to support it.
1. The Securities Industry's Regulatory Environment

To see that securities employment arbitration arises out of an
occupational licensing scheme, one must have a basic understanding of
the regulations governing that industry.30' There are two ways to trade
a security: on a securities exchange 30 2 or in the "over-the-counter"

market, 33 which simply means trading off an exchange. Virtually all
securities trades--on or off an exchange-are conducted by securities
"brokers" 304 or "dealers."3' 5 These broker-dealers, ranging from large
Wall Street investment banks to sole proprietorships, are the primary
participants in the securities industry.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934306 (the "Exchange Act")
requires broker-dealers to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") as a condition of doing business. 0 7 The SEC has

300. See infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text.
301. See generally HAZEN, supranote 150, § 10; SHELDON M. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND
SECURITIES MARKETS (1977 & Supp. 1995); 1 MACNEiL ET AL., supra note 13, § 13.1.1.
302. As one commentator describes:
An exchange, as the name implies, provides a central clearing house for the trading of
its listed securities. Originally all transactions took place physically on the floor of the
exchange. While this in large part is still true today, there has been movement towards
more of a national market system with automated quotations and a consolidated tape
reflecting all transactions and volume whether or not the transactions are made on the
exchange floor.
HAZEN, supra note 150, § 10.1, at 378.
303. Id.
304. "The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1994).
305.
The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a
bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either
individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
Id. § 78c(a)(5).
306. Id. §§ 78a-ll.
307. The Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a natural
person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a person other
than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose business is exclusively
intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national securities exchange)
to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect
any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security
(other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or
commercial bills) unless such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection
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authority to regulate broker-dealers, °8 but the bulk of the day-to-day
regulation of broker-dealers is generally delegated to SROs by the
SEC. 30 9 The Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to register with, and

submit to the rules of, an SRO as a condition of doing business.310
The SROs that broker-dealers must join may be either "a securities
association registered pursuant to [the Exchange Act]"' or "a national
securities exchange," 31 2 which means an exchange registered pursuant
to the Exchange Act.31 3 There is only one securities association regis-

tered under the Exchange Act, the National Association of Securities
315

Dealers ("NASD"). 314 There are eight national securities exchanges.
The only other SRO, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
("MSRB"), is for municipal securities dealers.3 1a

While the NASD in some ways resembles a private trade association
and the securities exchanges originated as private institutions, both the
NASD and the exchanges have lost much of their private character.31 7

(b) of this section.
Id. § 78o(a)(I). "Since it was assumed that the exchange would establish careful high standards for
entry and continuance in membership, [this provision] excluded from the registration requirements
brokers who confineo their activities solely to a registered securities exchange." JAFFE, supra note
301, § 2.04, at 19-20. And there are other exemptions from registration. See HAZEN, supranote 150,
§ 10.2.2, at 399-404.
30S. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
309. See HAZEN, supra note 150, § 10.2, at 380.
310. The Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any registered broker or dealer to effect any transaction in, or
induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than or [sic]
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills), unless such broker or
dealer is a member of a securities association registered pursuant to section 78o-3 of this
title or effects transactions in securities solely on a national securities exchange of which
it is a member.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (footnote omitted). But see 17 C.F.R. 240.15b9-1 (1995) (creating exemptions
from registration requirements of the Exchange Act).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8).
312. Id.
313. The rules governing national securities exchanges can be found in 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
314. HAZEN, supra note 150, § 10.2.
315. The eight include the three major securities exchanges (the New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, and Chicago Board Options Exchange) and five smaller exchanges (the
Boston Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock
Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange). See id.
316. For a discussion of municipal securities dealers and their interaction with the MSRB, see
id. § 10.5.
317. The Supreme Court has stated:
The limited-entry feature of exchanges led historically to their being treated by the courts
as private clubs, and to their being given great latitude by the courts in disciplining errant
members. As exchanges became a more and more important element in our Nation's
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The SROs now have many of the characteristics of government agencies.
An SRO may not come into existence without SEC approval,3"' and the
SEC has oversight responsibility with respect to the SROs. 3t 9 The
SROs must file their proposed rule changes with the SEC,32 and no
SRO rule change can take effect unless the SEC finds that the proposed
rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act. 321 The
SEC even has the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete from ... the
rules of a[n] [SRO]. ' 32 In fact, many changes in the SRO rules
governing arbitration have been made "largely in response to" SEC

initiatives ."2

The rules of each SRO require that certain employees of each of its
members register with the SRO.324 I use the term "securities employees" to refer to those employees required by SRO rules to register with
the SRO. 325 The SRO rules require securities employees to sign an
arbitration agreement in order to register with the SRO.326

economic and financial system, however, the private-club analogy became increasingly

inapposite and the ungoverned self-regulation became more and more obviously
inadequate, with acceleratingly grave consequences. This impotency ultimately led to the
enactment of the 1934 Act.
Thus arose the federally mandated duty of self-policing by exchanges. Instead of
giving the Commission the power to curb specific instances of abuse, the Act placed in
the exchanges a duty to register with the Commission, and decreed that registration could
not be granted unless the exchange submitted copies of its rules, and unless such rules
were 'Just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors."
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1963) (citations omitted).
318. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (governing registration as a national securities exchange); id. § 78o-3
(governing NASD).
319. See id. § 78o-3 (with respect to the NASD); id. § 78s (with respect to SROs).
320. See id. § 78s(b)(1).
321. See id. § 78s(b)(2).
322. See id. § 78s(c).
323. See 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 1250, 1251 (May 10, 1989).
324. See supra note 151.
325. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., NYSE Rules, supra note 151, 345.12 (requiring signature of securities
employees of Form U-4 which provides for arbitration of employment disputes); see also AMEX
Rules, supra note 151, 9391 cmt. .08.
The arbitration clause may appear on the document signed by the employee, see id., or said
document may provide that the employee shall abide by the rules of the SRO with which he or she
is registering. The SRO rules, in turn, require arbitration of disputes between securities employees
and their employers. See NYSE Rules, supra note 151, 2347.
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member
organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be
settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party, in accordance with the arbitration
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2. SROs as Private Associations or Occupational Licensors
My characterization of the securities laws as an occupational
licensing scheme would be wrong if, when an SRO requires that member
firms hire only employees who agree to arbitrate, it was engaged in
private, rather than government action.327 If the SRO requirement was
private action, then it might violate antitrust laws,328 but it would not
be an occupational licensing scheme.329 On the other hand, if the SRO
requirement is government action then the securities laws are, as this
Article contends, an occupational licensing scheme. The federal government has delegated governmental powers, including the power to license
entry into an occupation, to quasi-private organizations, the SROs.33 °
Courts have addressed the issue of whether SROs are government
or private entities."33 While some courts have broadly declared that

procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.
Id. With regards to the NYSE, present Form U-4, the document signed by securities employees, was
previously Form RE-I. See Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 791
(Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). Form U-4's wording has changed over the years but
invariably provides for arbitration of employment disputes. The Form U-4 at issue in Moore v.
Interacciones Global, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 4789(RWS), 1995 WL 33650 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995),
provided:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me
and my firm, or a customer or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under
the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations indicated in Item 10 [in this ca e,
National Association of Securities Dealers] as may be amended from time to time and
that any arbitration award rendered against me may be entered as a judgment in any court
of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at *I. Form U-4 currently provides that the employee "agree[s] to abide by the Statate(s),
Constitution(s), Rules and By-Laws as any of the foregoing are amended from time to time of the
agency, jurisdiction or organization with or to which I am filing or submitting this application." 3
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 7110, at 7089-4 (1996).
327. See infra notes 331-51 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
329. See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-PrivateDistinction, and the
Independenceof ConstitutionalLaw,10 CONST. COMMENTARY 329,334-35 (1993) (listing "licensing
of occupations" among "[e]xplicit government actions").
330. This delegation of licensing power should be familiar to those involved in legal education.
Forty-three states have delegated the power to license law schools to a nominally private trade
association, the American Bar Association. See Leonard J. Nelson, Ill, Religious Discrimination,
Christian Mission, and Legal Education: The Implications of the Oral Roberts University
Accreditation Controversy, 15 CUMB. L. REv. 663, 678 (1985).
331. See infra notes 332-51 and accompanying text. Courts have done so when presented with
the argument that SRO action violates the United States Constitution. The Constitution restricts
government, but not private, action. The only exception is the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against slavery. See LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed. 1988).
Under this "state action" doctrine, therefore, SRO action can violate the Constitution only if that
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SROs are "government" or "private," most courts have more carefully
stated that SROs are "government" or "private" with respect to the
particularSRO action at issue in the case.332 For instance, courts have
held that SROs are government actors when delisting a corporation's
stock, 33 3 but not when arbitrating disputes. 334 The question here is
whether SROs are engaged in private or government action when

requiring member firms to hire only employees who agree to arbitrate.
No reported cases discuss this question. In fact, none discuss
whether SROs are private or government actors when establishing any of
their requirements for becoming a securities employee. There are,
action is fairly attributable to a government, but not otherwise. See Henry C. Strickland, The State
Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 596-633 (1991)
(categorizing distinct state action theories by which each of the following types of conduct may be
considered state action: (I) overt actions of state employees, officers, and agencies; (2) creation and
enforcement of substantive civil law; (3) state inaction: denial of judicial relief or other state
intervention; (4) governmentally regulated private conduct; (5) joint participation between state
officials and private entities; and (6) private entities assuming government functions or powers).
332. "[T]he exact status of the NASD is unsettled: it is granted governmental-type powers for
some functions, while maintaining its private nature for others." Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 315, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted). In Ross, the defendants sought to compel the NASD, which was
not a party to the case, to comply with a subpeona to produce transcripts of testimony given before
it by individuals who were also not parties to the case. See id. at 315. The NASD argued "that its
law enforcement duties [made] it a quasi-governmental agency and that, as a result, its investigative
files are entitled to the same privilege against discovery as that afforded to a governmental
investigative body." Id. at 315-16. The court denied the NASD a privilege from discovery of
information NASD obtained from its members but left open the possibility that the NASD would
have the privilege with respect to information obtained from the SEC or other government agency.
See id. at 316 n.l.
333. In IntercontinentalIndustries v. American Stock Exchange, 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971),
the Fifth Circuit analyzed the procedure followed by the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") and
the SEC in delisting a corporation's stock from AMEX. The delisted corporation claimed that it was
denied a full and fair hearing on the delisting motion with such denial constituting a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 940. The Fifth Circuit rejected "the
Exchange's position that constitutional due process is not required since the Exchange is not a
governmental agency." Id. at 941. The court held that "[t]he intimate involvement of the Exchange
with the Securities and Exchange Commission brings it within the purview of the Fifth Amendment
controls over governmental due process." Id.; see also Villani v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 348
F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (recognizing that the law is well-settled that the Fifth
Amendment due process requirements apply to hearings conducted by the Exchange), order modified
on other grounds, 367 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y.), affd sub nom. Sloan v. New York Stock Exch.,
Inc., 489 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1973); Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1259
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that disciplinary proceedings by the Exchange are private in character and
are therefore subject to due process requirements).
334. See Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709, at *13-14
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) (holding that NASD arbitrators' award of punitive damages was not
government action), aft'd, 83 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996); First Heritage Corp. v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 785 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that NASD arbitrators' award of
fees to defray cost of arbitration proceeding was not government action).
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however, a few cases discussing whether SROs are private or government
actors when investigating whether securities employees have violated
federal securities law and/or SRO rules.335 If the SRO concludes that
such a violation has occurred, the SRO may revoke or suspend the
violator's status as a securities employee or condition that status on
payment of a fine (or some other action) by the violator.336 The few
cases on point wrongly hold that SROs are private actors when engaged
in disciplinary investigations of securities employees.337 The seminal

335. "The Exchange Act assigned the NASD and the other SROs the responsibility for
conducting investigations and commencing disciplinary proceedings against member firms and their
associated member representatives relating to compliance with the federal securities laws and
regulations." Datek Sec. Corp. v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 875 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (1994)). "The Exchange Act expressly provides that the SEC
and the United States Courts of Appeals have the discretion to stay any sanctions imposed by the
NASD pending review [by the SEC and Courts of Appeals]." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d),
78y(c)).
336. Such SRO disciplinary orders "are subject to a full and independent review by the SEC
as to the facts as well as the law." Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1995).
337. The most recent such case is Datek Securities Corp. v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, 875 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Datek, the NASD had filed an administrative
complaint against Datek Securities Corporation and certain of its present and former employees. See
id. at 231-32. Datek's employees were associated members of the NASD. See id. at 232. Datek and
its employees sued the NASD seeking injunctive relief restraining the NASD's administrative
proceedings against them. See id. Datek and its employees argued, among other things, "that the
NASD's disciplinary proceeding violates the Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]." Id. at
233. In rejecting this argument, Judge Motley held that "the NASD is a private corporation not
subject to the strictures of the Constitution." Id.
For the proposition that "the NASD is a private, rather than a governmental, actor," Judge
Motley cites four cases, id. at 234, only one of which supports this proposition. That one case is
United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed in the text below. See infra text
accompanying notes 338-46. The other three include another case presided over by Judge Motley,
Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. Hellmers, 502 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Interestingly, the court in
Bruan held that the NASD was a government actor. See id. at 901-02. Bruan involved a suit by a
broker-dealer against the NASD and other defendants. See id. at 900. The broker-dealer alleged that
the defendants engaged in an illegal conspiracy against the company and that the defendants
"wrongfully caused NASD to... institute formal disciplinary proceedings against [the brokerdealer]." Id. The defendants removed the case to federal court, see id., under the power of a federal
statute which provided that an action may be removed to federal court if it is against "[a]ny officer
of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color [of
law]." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994). The court held that "[w~ith respect to disciplinary proceedings,
NASD should be considered as a 'person' acting under the SEC." 502 F. Supp. at 902. Because
Datek addressed government action under the Fifth Amendment and Bruan addressed it under a
removal statute, a distinction is available to reconcile the two cases. That distinction, however, may
not explain the differing results in the two cases. Judge Motley switched from the correct view to
the incorrect one.
The other two inapposite cases cited in Datek are a case applying the exhaustion doctrine
to exhaustion of NASD remedies, McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, 733 F. Supp. 694, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and a case not addressing the government
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case is United States v. Solomon.338
Solomon involved a broker-dealer who was a member of the
NYSE.339 When the NYSE learned that its rules may have been
violated by the broker-dealer, the NYSE summoned an officer of the

broker-dealer, Solomon, to appear before the NYSE and testify about the
matter.340 Solomon did so. He was subsequently convicted in criminal
court for violating SEC regulations. 4' On appeal, he argued that his
statements to the NYSE were inadmissible in his criminal trial because

of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.342 Writing
for the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly explained that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment restricts government, but not private,
action. 343 He then rejected Solomon's contention that "interrogation by
NYSE must be deemed the equivalent of interrogation by the United
States because the Exchange has become in effect the arm of the
Government in administering portions of the Securities Exchange
Act."3' In short, Solomon held that the NYSE was a private, not
government, actor when interrogating Solomon. Judge Friendly wrote that
"[i]t is not enough to create an agency relationship [between the SEC and
the NYSE] that Solomon's conduct violated both a rule of NYSE,
thereby subjecting him to disciplinary action by that body, and federal

law, with consequent liability to civil and criminal enforcement
proceedings by the Government."34 5 This reasoning was adopted by
Judge Posner nine years later in Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co.346

action issue at all, Maschler v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 827 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). See Datek, 875 F. Supp. at 234.
Datek and Solomon virtually exhaust the case law on whether SROs are governmental or
private entities when deciding what conduct results in loss of securities employee status. See Sloan
v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 489 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]hen [plaintiffs] became members
of the Exchange they consented, quite knowingly and intelligently to [the Exchange's] disciplinary
procedures ...
.
338. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
339. See id. at 864.
340. See id. at 865. The NYSE Constitution provided that, if Solomon failed to testify, he would
lose his license. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1405 (1994).
341. See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 865. The regulations under which Solomon was indicted are 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, -5 (1995).
342. See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 866. "[N]or shall any person... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
343. See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 868.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 869.
346. 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984). Bernstein sued the Chicago Mercantile Exchange alleging,
among other things, that the Exchange's action of auctioning his seat on the Exchange violated his
Fifth Amendment right to due process. Judge Posner responded:

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss1/2

70

Ware: Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent
VOLUNTARY CONSENT

Certainly, Judges Friendly and Posner are correct that a private trade
association is not an agency of government merely because its own rules
prohibit some of the same conduct the government prohibits. But there
is far more of a connection between the SEC and the SROs than that. As
stated above, the SROs control who may lawfully be a securities
employee. Even if an employer wants to hire an applicant as a securities
employee, and even if the applicant wants to work for the employer as
a securities employee, the SROs can invoke the power of government
(court orders) to stop it. The employer and applicant do not have the
option of achieving their goal by "opting out" of the SROs. By law, the
employer is required to maintain membership in an SRO to remain in the

securities business. Therefore, becoming a securities employee is not just
a matter of contract with the employer. It is also a matter of securing
approval from an SRO. That is the essence of occupational licensing, a
governmental power.347 No private trade association could invoke the

The argument for treating a securities or commodity exchange as an arm of the federal
government is that federal law imposes on the exchange a duty of policing its members
that makes the exchange in effect a law-enforcement agent of the government. But as
Judge Friendly pointed out in the Solomon case, the agency analogy is upside down. The
exchange is the principal rather than the agent; the purpose of the federal law is to
strengthen the power and responsibility of the exchange in performing a policing function
that preexisted [any] federal regulation.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted). Judge Posner misstates the argument for treating an exchange, or other
SROs, as an arm of the federal government. The argument is not that law "imposes on the [SRO]
a duty of policing its members." Id. The argument is that law requires membership in an SRO to get
an occupational license.
347. The received wisdom among legal scholars is that the government/private distinction is
merely a consequence of positive law, rather than a distinction that logically precedes positive law.
The doctrine of state action is an attempt to maintain a public/private distinction
by attributing some conduct to the state and some to private actors. The doctrine seems,
at least, less secure under constitutional positivism than under a natural law regime. The
positivist cannot invoke the inherently private realm entailed by the very concept of
natural rights. More fundamentally, since any private action acquiesced in by the state can
be seen to derive its power from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization at
will, positivism potentially implicates the state in every "private" action not prohibited
by law.
Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982); see also Kay, supra note 329, at 334 ("The overwhelming weight of
published academic opinion has rejected the premise that legal doctrine can rest on a supposed
distinction between public and private actions.").
This Article simply accepts the "government" and "private" categories as they are defined
by current positive law. Occupational licensing is a government power. See Kenneth Culp Davis, The
Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REV. 193, 262-63 (1956); Henry J. Friendly,
Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1297 (1975); Kay, supra note 329, at 334
(listing "licensing of occupations" among "[e]xplicit government actions"); David M. Lawrence,
PrivateExercise of GovernmentalPower, 61 IND. L.. 647, 656, 667 (1986) (licensing of racehorse
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power of government to stop an employer from hiring a job applicant.348 Only the government can bar entry into an occupation.
Prior to the Exchange Act, the exchanges were private associations
whose rules had the same legal effect as other contracts. The exchanges
could not invoke government power to bar entry into an occupation.
Those who wished to engage in the securities business had a right to do
so with or without membership on an exchange. Those who did not
become members of an exchange could hire securities employees without
regard for exchange rules.
The Exchange Act changed that. Its system of "self-regulation" by
the securities industry rests on a delegation of governmental power from
the SEC to the exchanges and other SROs.34 9 The SROs have been

owners, trainers, and jockeys by The Jockey Club and licensing lawyers by the American Bar
Association is government action); David B. Dellenbach, Note, Barnard v. Utah State Bar and Public
Access to PrivateEntities Which Carry Out GovernmentalFunctions:Is This Bar a Private Club?,
1992 UTAH L. REv. 1021, 1025 ("Bar disciplinary activities and admission processes are arguably
public functions because state supreme courts delegate these functions to state bars."); Michael R.
Phillips, Note, The Constitutionalityof Employer-Accessible Child Abuse Registries:Due Process
Implications of Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92 MICH. L. REv. 139, 159-62 (1993)
(discussing occupational licensing by state governments and stating that "[I]icensing decisions must
meet the mandates of the Due Process Clause").
The American Bar Association exercises government power when it licenses (accredits) law
schools. See Nelson, supranote 330, at 678 (citing Oral Roberts Univ. v. American Bar Ass'n, No.
81-C-3171 (N.D. II1.July 17, 1981)). With respect to the agencies that accredit colleges, "[i]t seems
likely that a court would find no 'state action' . . . simply based on the fact that accreditation is
linked to the receipt of federal funds or government regulation. However, when accreditation is a
substitute for state licensing.., it is much more likely that 'state action' will be found." Michael
W. Prairie & Lori A. Chamberlain, Due Process in the Accreditation Context, 21 J.C. & U.L. 61,
74 (1994).
With regards to the procedures and actions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA"), contrary to Betty Chang, Note, Coercion Theory and the State Action DoctrinesApplied
in NCAA v. Tarkanian and NCAA v. Miller, 22 J.C. & U.L. 133 (1995), the NCAA does not
exercise government power. It is not an occupational licensor because no law requires colleges to
join the NCAA in order to have athletic programs.
348. A private trade association could invoke the power of government to enforce, as a contract,
its own rules, including rules relating to hiring. But this does not stop an employer from hiring an
applicant. It only makes the employer choose between membership in the trade association and
hiring the applicant.
349. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,366 (1963) (discussing "the type
of partnership between government and private enterprise that marks the design of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"); id. at 371 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that "[the purpose of the selfregulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act was to delegate governmental power").
"[lUn important respects, the self-regulatory body is an official arm or delegate of
governmental power." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURrIEs MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, (pt. 4) at 723 (1st Sess. 1963). "In effect, both Congress
and the SEC believed that the NASD must exercise some delegated governmental power in order
to perform its statutory responsibility of assisting in the enforcement of the federal securities
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"'delegated governmental power in order to enforce ... compliance by
members of the industry with both the legal requirements laid down in
the Exchange Act and ethical standards going beyond those requirements.""'35 By requiring broker-dealers to join an SRO, the Exchange
Act gave SROs the power to control entry into an1 occupation. Exercise
35
of that power is government, not private, action.
3.

The Wrong Baseline

For the reasons just discussed, securities employment arbitration is
fundamentally different from other employment arbitration. Employment
arbitration agreements in the securities industry are formed against a very
different baseline of rights than the one underlying other employment
arbitration agreements. Other employment arbitration agreements are
formed against a baseline in which the government leaves arbitration, like
most terms of employment, a matter of private contract.352 In contrast,

laws .... " Vincent L. Briccetti, Note, Governmental Action and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 585, 595 (1979).
The NASD itself states that it is exercising government powers in its role of licensing
securities employees. See National Association of Securities Dealers, Notices to Members No. 94-95,
availablein 1994 NASD LEXIS 52, at *34-35 ("Federal law requires broker/dealers to be members
of SRO's, and as a result, to be subject to the SROs' rules of arbitration .... [The Federal
Government] cannot compel membership in the NASD unless the NASD provides [due process]
guarantees.").
350. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 616 F.2d
1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-75, at 23 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 201). The Court in Merrill Lynch held that the doctrine requiring litigants to
exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief requires exhaustion of NASD
remedies. Id. at 1370; accordTouche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1979); First
Jersey See., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1979); Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. Hellmers,
502 F. Supp. 897, 905-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
351. While Solomon and Datek hold that SROs are private actors when disciplining their
members, the issue still seems to be open. In the context of a NYSE investigation of a securities
employee, the Seventh Circuit was recently "faced with the question of whether the NYSE ... is
a governmental actor whose jurisdictional rules and enforcement actions are subject to due process
analysis." Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, Gold argued that
he had a Fifth Amendment due process right to actual notice, rather than constructive
notice, that the NYSE was exercising jurisdiction over him to investigate his conduct
while employed by a member firm. Gold concede[d] that the NYSE followed its own
rules in providing notice of its investigation, but he asserts that the constructive notice
allowed by Rule 477 is constitutionally inadequate ....
Id. at 990-91 (footnote omitted). While the Seventh Circuit did not decide this issue because it was
waived on appeal, id. at 991, the fact that the court viewed it as an undecided issue may be
significant. See also Briccetti, supra note 349, at 602 (concluding that "the NASD's investigative
and disciplinary activities meet the constitutional tests for governmental action").
352. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1985).
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the baseline underlying securities employment arbitration requires all
broker-dealers and their employees to arbitrate employment disputes.353
I advocate repeal of that requirement.
I do so because the freedom "to engage in [one] of the common
occupations of life' 355 should be conditioned on consent to arbitrate.
I am a skeptic of occupational licensing in general, on the ground that it
typically does more harm than good to consumers of the goods and
services produced by those licensed.356 I am particularly skeptical of
claims that investors benefit from a requirement that securities employees
agree to arbitration in order to get an occupational license. 3 7 Rather,
I suspect that many broker-dealers thought they would benefit from the
arbitration requirement and they persuaded the SROs to adopt it.358
Another reason to advocate repeal of the securities law requirement
that all broker-dealers and their employees arbitrate employment disputes
is that the requirement poses a threat to employment arbitration outside
the securities industry. As stated above, most individual employment

353. See supra Part IV.C.1. See generally Dunphy, supra note 99 (discussing mandatory
arbitration in the securities industry).
354. There is an attractive alternative to repealing the SRO requirement that member firms hire
only those who agree to arbitrate. That is stripping the SROs of their governmental powers, including
the occupational-licensing power to decide who may be a securities employee. Restoring the SROs
to their former status as private associations and leaving government powers in the hands of the SEC
would, however, require enormous changes to the securities laws.
355. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
356. See generally S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS (1987) (examining occupational
licensing and its effect on consumers); Robert Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless
Concept "Group Boycott", 39 VAND. L. REV. 1507, 1576-78 (1986) (summarizing economic
arguments against occupational licensing and comparing occupational licensing with private
agreements among members of an industry).
357. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), Merrill
Lynch argued that the NYSE rule requiring arbitration of employment disputes "falls under the
Exchange's mandate to protect the investing public and to insure just and equitable trade practices."
Id. at 134. The Court summarized Merrill Lynch's contention as follows:
[C]onfidence in the industry and in the integrity and ability of its members has been
jeopardized by failures of major brokerage houses with consequent substantial losses to
the public. Investor confidence would be further undermined, it is said, by protracted
litigation between member firms and their employees over disputes that arise out of
employment relationships; public airing of every claim ofthis kind will erode confidence
in the market; and arbitration, on the other hand, will internalize these disputes and
provide an expeditious and economical method of resolution by arbitrators familiar with
industry customs and practices.
Id. As the Court stated in MerrillLynch, "the relationship between compulsory employer-employee
arbitration and fair dealing and investor protection is 'extremely attenuated and peripheral, if it exists
at all."' Id. at 135 (citing Brief for the United States at 9).
358. That the SROs would act in the interest of the broker-dealers is not surprising because the
membership of the SROs consists of broker-dealers.
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arbitration cases to date have arisen from the securities industry, and
these cases, particularly Gilmer, have generated strong opposition to the
enforcement of pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements." 9
There is a real possibility that, through legislative, administrative, or
judicial action, pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements will
become unenforceable. 6 For the reasons given in Part III, that would
be a substantial restriction on freedom of contract, i.e., the freedom to
determine one's own duties through a process of voluntary consent. If
this unfortunate outcome occurs, it may be because of a failure to
distinguish between individual employment arbitration in and out of the
securities industry.
Outside of the securities industry, if Employer makes arbitration a
non-negotiable condition of employment, Applicant can go to other
employers in the industry. One of them may offer Applicant a job
without an arbitration clause. In such an industry, diversity and the
freedom to choose among options reigns. Even if all the employers in the

industry make arbitration a non-negotiable term, that should not be
troubling. The reason is that if there is a competitive labor market in the
industry, employees are receiving higher wages (or more of something
else they value) than they would in the absence of the arbitration
clause. 361 And most or all of the employees prefer the higher

359. See supra Part.I.C.
360. See supra Part III.A.
361. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
The sinister explanation [for standardized contracts) is that the seller refuses to
dicker separately with each purchaser because the buyer has no choice but to accept his
terms. This assumes an absence of competition. If one seller offers unattractive terms, a
competing seller, wanting sales for himself, will offer more attractive terms. The process
will continue until the terms are optimal. All the firms in the industry may find it
economical to use standard contracts and refuse to negotiate with purchasers. But what
is important is not whether there is haggling in every transaction but whether competition
forces sellers to incorporate in their standard contracts terms that protect the purchasers.
Id. at 114. What Posner says about sellers applies with equal force to employers. If one employer
offers terms, such as an arbitration clause, that are unattractive to prospective employees, a
competing employer acting in its own interest will offer more attractive terms. The process will
continue until the terms are optimal. What is widely recognized about competition's effect on price
applies to other contract terms as well.
Competition's effect on non-price terms may, however, be less than its effect on price. For
example, an employer might present the employee with a form employment contract containing a
number of terms including price/wages and arbitration. The employee may not know about the
arbitration clause unless she reads and understands the contract. In contrast, the employee can likely
learn how much she will be paid without reading and understanding the contract. In other words, the
cost of acquiring and processing information on one contract term (the arbitration clause) is greater
than for another contract term (wages). See Sternlight, supra note 103, at 687-88; see generally

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

75

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:83

wage/arbitration contract to the lower wage/no arbitration contract
because if they did not, an employer would see the opportunity to attract
employees by offering the latter terms.362 So outside the securities
industry, government has left arbitration, like most other terms of
employment, a matter of private contract.
In the securities industry, by contrast Applicant cannot find any
employer who might hire her without an arbitration clause. Even if an
employer wished to, it could not. It would be a violation of the Exchange
Act to do that and continue to operate as a broker-dealer.363 Thus,
Applicant consents to arbitration in a circumstance which many feel
gives her no other choice. That feeling, I believe, motivates many of the
calls to make such agreements unenforceable. 6 4 The commentators
advocating this say that such agreements are coerced, rather than
voluntary. 365 This is wrong because the distinction between
voluntariness and coercion turns on the baseline of rights specified by
non-contract law.366 And, with respect to the securities industry, that
baseline does not give Applicant and Employer the right to contract for
an agreement without an arbitration clause. 367 That baseline is the
problem.368
Some will go further and argue that the baselines underlying all
employment arbitration, in or out of the securities industry, should be
changed. They could be changed to make the right to litigate employment disputes an inalienable right. However, that would make settlement
agreements of employment disputes unenforceable. To avoid that result,
some might argue that the right to litigate employment disputes should
be inalienable until the dispute arises, at which time the right should be
alienable. That is the argument many commentators are really making
when they say arbitration arising out of pre-dispute employment

Victor P. Goldberg,InstitutionalChange andtheQuasi-InvisibleHand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461,484-85
(1974). This information concern is addressed somewhat by the doctrines of mutual assent and
procedural unconscionability. See supra notes 139-83, 224-27 and accompanying text.
362. See POSNER, supra note 361, at 114; R. H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional
Framework A Comment, 17 J.L. & ECON. 493, 494-95 (1974).
363. See supra Part IV.C.I.
364. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 102-04.
366. See supra Part IV.A.
367. See supra Part IV.C.1.
368. The problem is not that arbitration law fails to ensure that arbitration is voluntary.
Arbitration law is, with the exception of the separability doctrine, well-suited to ensure voluntary
consent. See supra Part III. The problem is the baseline underlying that consent in the industry that
has generated most of the employment arbitration law. It is that baseline that should be changed.
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agreements is coerced but arbitration arising out of post-dispute
arbitration agreements is voluntary. They are arguing that the right to

litigate employment claims is an important one and employees often do
not realize how important it is until a dispute arises. 69 Therefore,
employees should not be free to alienate this right by entering into a predispute arbitration agreement, even if the employee voluntarily consents
to it.
This argument must be made to Congress, not the courts, unless the
Supreme Court changes its interpretation of the FAA. Without such a

change, this argument will fail in court because the FAA, as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly interpreted it, requires courts "to place [arbitration]
agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts."'3 70 The argument
that the right to litigate should be less alienable than other rights defies
this requirement.371
V.

CONCLUSION

Virtually everyone agrees that employment disputes should be
resolved in arbitration only if the parties have voluntarily consented to
do so. 372 Contrary to what many commentators, legislators, and agen-

cies say, arbitration arising out of pre-dispute arbitration agreements can
be based on voluntary consent. Ensuring that it is requires courts to apply

369. See, e.g., Sander & Fleming, supra note 103, at 15 (Congress should enact "protection
against uninformed pre-dispute waivers of judicial remedies."). This argument is nicely made by
Sarah Rudolph Cole:
One-shot players, such as employees, improperly value the inclusion of an arbitration
agreement in their employment agreement. Employees suffer from judgmental bias as a
result of their personal experiences. That is, they systematically ignore or deemphasize
the likelihood that a low probability event will occur because the event has never affected
them. In the employment context, this judgmental bias causes employees to misapprehend
the risk that they will engage in litigation with their employer. This informational
problem leads employees to demand lower wages and fewer benefits than they might if
they were fully cognizant of the risks present in the proposed arbitral agreement.
Cole, supranote 18, at 453 (citing Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:UnderstandingPerceived
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 465 (Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky eds., 1982)). This is an argument against contract enforcement, not only in the
context of individual employment arbitration agreements, but in all contexts involving parties who
"misapprehend the risk" that a pertinent event will occur. In short, it is an argument that freedom
of contract should be confined to contexts in which both parties have adequate (however defined)
information.
370. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924)).
371. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 61 (1995).
372. See supra notes 102-12.
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the contract law doctrines of mutual assent and duress to arbitration
373
agreements in the same manner courts apply them to other contracts.
This, in turn, requires repeal of the separability doctrine. It does not,
however, require any other change in the law.
In the absence of the separability doctrine, an employee resisting
arbitration on the ground that she did not voluntarily consent to it would
be in the same position as any party resisting judicial enforcement of any
contract. The employee could make arguments based on the contract law
doctrines that operate to ensure that contract law enforces only duties
assumed through voluntary consent. If the court is persuaded by these
arguments, the employee will have no duty to arbitrate. If, on the other
hand, the court is unpersuaded by such arguments, the employee will
have a duty to arbitrate. That duty, however, like all those enforced by
contract law, will have been voluntarily assumed.
Overruling Prima Paint's separability doctrine is both a necessary
and sufficient condition to making the law well-suited to ensure that
arbitration occurs only through voluntary consent. Ensuring that,
however, does not ensure much. The distinction between voluntarilyassumed duties and coercively-assumed duties presupposes a baseline of
rights established by non-contract law prior to the assumption of the duty
in question.374 Whether an assumption of a duty is voluntary or coerced
depends on the content of the baseline.375 The baseline underlying
securities employment arbitration compels the conclusion that such
arbitration in the securities industry is often voluntary. That conclusion
should lead us to change the particular baseline in the securities laws. It
should not mislead us into changing the branch of contract law known
as arbitration law that is, with the exception of the separability doctrine,
well-suited to ensure that disputes are resolved by arbitration only when
the parties have voluntarily consented to do so.

373. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
374. See supra Part IV.A.
375. See supra Part IV.A.
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